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Three basic attributes describe all good investigators:
1. They are not afraid to be wrong. They will accept facts
that are contrary to their present theory
2. They readily admit that they do not know everything.
When they need help, they seek help
3. They listen to other investigators. They do not necessarily
believe them, but they do listen to them.

R. H. Wood & R. W. Sweginnis,
(1995)
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Degree:

MSc
ABSTRACT

The purpose of this dissertation is to analyse the implementation of the Code for the
Investigation of Marine Casualties and Incidents, focusing on the roles of politicians,
casualty investigating bodies and casualty investigation reports.
The implementation of Annex 1 to IMO Resolution A.849(20) as amended, may be
weakened by excessive and inadequate political reactions in the aftermath of a
casualty, especially if it causes an environmental catastrophe. The logic behind these
reactions and the several ways they are expressed, are thoroughly examined.
In contrast with the majority of IMO Member States, several States have established
a casualty investigating body, autonomous from the regulator i.e. the maritime
administration. The diverse and at times conflicting philosophies are researched and
their implications on the implementation of the IMO Code analysed.
The maritime industry has always been conservative and history attests that internal
cultural changes may take years to transpire, if at all achieved. In discussing this
phenomenon, the dissertation examines the contribution of casualty investigation
reports towards achieving foresight and overcoming this traditional approach. A
casualty investigation report is analysed.

Innovative to the industry’s practice,

‘Conclusions, Analysis, Evidence’ diagrams were constructed to determine whether
this tool serves the promulgation of information.
The final chapter brings together the entire study into a model, explaining how the
industry may achieve active foresight, through the implementation of the IMO Code.

KEYWORDS:

A.849(20); CAE; Casualty Investigation; Code; Maritime
Accident; Maritime Incident; Safety.
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
Maritime1 casualties are an unpleasant fact and have been around since mankind first
ventured out to sea.
The industrial revolution in the 1800’s meant the British Isles relied heavily on the
importation of raw materials. This massive activity marked the dawn of the British
Merchant Navy era.

In those early days of steamships, there were almost no

guarantees of a ship’s safe return. Land-based society ignored the tragedies that
happened out at sea and for seafarers and their families, seaborne trade carried a dear
price.

Under increasing public pressure, however, the United Kingdom (UK)

Parliament appointed a committee in 1836 to investigate the escalation in the number
of shipwrecks2.
In 1870, Samuel Plimsoll, then a UK Member of Parliament from the industrial
Midlands, launched a parliamentary campaign on behalf of the British Merchant
Seamen3. Plimsoll relayed the public’s serious concern of unscrupulous shipowners
who had no interest in the crew’s safety and always stood to gain, irrespective of the
outcome of the maritime adventure. What really mattered was the carriage of goods,
and at worst, the collection of insurance money if their ships were lost. During this
campaign, Plimsoll referred to “coffin ships” overloaded with cargo and which
1

Research revealed that the words “marine” and “maritime” are often used interchangeably. In the
English language, the word “marine” relates to the scientific area e.g. marine science or marine
biology. In comparison, the word “maritime” relates to shipping e.g. maritime studies and maritime
law. There is only one exception and in one particular discipline – marine insurance, but this is
more of a tradition rather than for any particular grammatical reason. Throughout this dissertation,
the word “marine” is only used where there is a direct quotation or reference to material, which
makes use of this word without any distinction.

2

G. Peters, The Plimsoll Line, 1975 at p. v.

3

G. Peters, ibid.

1

hardly ever made a safe crossing. It would take 15 years before Plimsoll’s pleas
resulted in the UK Board of Trade assuming full responsibility of the Plimsoll Line
in 18854.
The advent of the “coffin ships” had generated what years later turned out to be a
widely accepted international maritime convention.
The tragic loss of the Titanic in 1912 was also a major impetus to the development of
international regulations governing safety of life at sea. Two years after the disaster,
an international conference adopted the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) 1914
Convention. A further milestone in the development of international regulations was
the grounding of the Torrey Canyon in 1967. It was immediately evident that the Oil
Pollution Convention of 1954 was inadequate to mitigate the consequences of
environmental catastrophes of such dimensions.

As a result, an International

Conference on Marine Pollution was convened at the International Maritime
Organization (IMO) and in 1973, the International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution from Ships was adopted.
These conventions and subsequent amendments remain a perpetual symbol of public
concern. The maritime industry had finally acknowledged that loss of life at sea and
marine pollution are unacceptable and had to be prevented. It was also recognised
that the gateway to the prevention of a maritime casualty was (and still is) an
adequate investigation5.
In order to provide IMO Member States with maritime casualty investigation
procedures, the twentieth IMO Assembly adopted Resolution 849 on November 27,
1997. The Assembly Resolution included a code for the investigation of marine

4

Ibid.

5

Deschênes views casualty investigation as a “preventive medicine” with the sole purpose of
improving safety and prevention of recurrences. See B. M. Deschênes, Study on Marine Casualty
Investigations in Canada (for the Minister of Transport), (1984) at p. 158.

2

casualties and incidents (IMO Code). Annexed to an Assembly Resolution, the IMO
Code is legally termed as soft law or para-droit and is non-mandatory.
The adoption of the IMO Code meant a huge step forward was made towards
improving casualty investigations in many ways.

Almost six years later, IMO

Member States still consider the IMO Code an adequate framework, although the
extent of its implementation differs from one country to another.
Against this background, the dissertation critically analyses three aspects in relation
to the implementation of the IMO Code.
Chapter 2 undertakes a critique on blame and spontaneous reactions and discusses
how these actions may frustrate the spirit of the IMO Code. Chapter 3 examines the
different roles of investigating bodies in relation to the implementation of the IMO
Code. Chapter 4 then focuses on casualty investigation reports vis-à-vis hindsight
and foresight. A case study introduces Conclusions, Analysis and Evidence (CAE)
diagrams. Chapter 5 provides a visual link of how, rather than benefiting from the
lessons learnt, deficiencies in these three major areas may lead to further casualties.
A short historical background to the adoption of IMO Resolution A.849(20) is
described in Appendix 1 to this dissertation. The Appendix also heightens the
provisions prescribing flag States’ obligations and the rights of port and coastal
States to investigate casualties onboard ships.

3

CHAPTER 2 THE ROLE OF POLITICIANS IN (FRUSTRATING) SAFETY
INVESTIGATIONS
This chapter mainly focuses on how the actions of politicians can hinder safety
investigations. Conversely, their inactions may equally impede safety investigations,
thereby frustrating the IMO Code. One of the ongoing criticisms is that only a few
IMO Member States carry out timely casualty investigations6.
Two years to the date since the Maltese tanker Kristal broke in two in the Bay of
Biscay with the loss of 11 lives, it was reported that the Malta Maritime Authority
(MMA) had still not issued the final report, even though it had circulated a draft
confidential copy to the interested parties for their comments7.
The delay was ascribed to the Kristal carrying a cargo of molasses and not black oil,
implying, that the political pressure on MMA, nationally and internationally, was
insignificant compared to the casualties of the Erika and the recent Prestige. Others
fear that such delays result from priorities given to financial assets over safety related
issues8.
This resistance may be also attributed to politicians, who may not entirely understand
the importance of shipping interest and where it falls. This suggests that it is only in

6

C86/10, Work Programme and Budget for the Twenty-Second Financial Period 2002-2003.
Proposals by the Secretary-General, (IMO, 2001b).

7

See B. Reyes, When Oil and Water Count More than the Lost Lives of Seafarers, (2003a) at p. 5.
The MT Kristal broke in two on February 27, 2001 and subsequently foundered.

8

M. Grey, Digesting Lessons of Safety, (2002a) at pp. 24-25.

4

the wake of a very serious casualty that shipping reaches a high profile – only to
subside again by time, with other issues taking over9.
Dixon10 identifies four different environments, external to an organisation, which if
considered in the context of the maritime industry, may help to explain what
influences (and determines) the level of response to maritime casualties. These are •

Economic;

•

Social and cultural;

•

Political and legal; and

•

Technological.

Thus, the acid test for a maritime state encountering these problems and criticism is
whether or not it can get down to the grass roots and analyse how to discharge its
obligations under international maritime conventions.

2.1

The Actions of Politicians in the Aftermath of a Very Serious Casualty11

Very serious casualties like the Erika12 and the Prestige have shown to what extent
the reaction of the industry may extend. Whilst the leaking cargo has long since
either been pumped out of the wreck or brought under control, yet, the political
repercussions are still unfolding.
Rather than discussing the political issues per se, the concept of political actions and
spontaneous reactions is analysed. In so doing, the reasons as to why politicians may
resort to these extreme measures, rather than implementing the IMO Code is
discussed. The chapter does not only present why such actions are taken, but also
9

View expressed by P. K. Mukherjee in a personal interview August 13, 2002.

10

R. Dixon, The Management Task, 1997 at p. 126.

11

The term ‘Very Serious Casualty’ as used in this dissertation, has the same definition as given in
IMO Resolution A.849(20), Section 4.2.

12

This writer was part of the team, which investigated the sinking of the MT Erika on December 12,
1999. On several occasions, this dissertation will make references to the MT Erika casualty
investigation.

5

how these actions frustrate the spirit of the IMO Code. Regional and global efforts,
whose success may result in a better implementation of the IMO Code, are identified
and discussed.

2.2

International Co-Operation During Casualty Investigations

Following the Prestige casualty, which for the second time in three years resulted in
severe polluted beaches on the western coasts of two European Union (EU) Member
States, the French President Jacques Chirac was quoted saying: “France and Europe
must not leave these gangsters of the sea to profit cynically from the lack of
transparency in the current system”. Playing the traditional political song and dance,
Loyola de Palacio, Vice-President of the European Commission in charge of
transport and energy immediately declared: “…the main problem is that there are
tanker ships on the sea that are ecological bombs”. She also confirmed, “{w}e are
going to call for an administrative decision…so that the most risky fuel, which is the
heavy fuel, is not transported on the most risky ships”13.
Rather than an adequate implementation of the IMO Code and a reflection of its true
spirit, several very serious casualties (especially those which result in severe
pollution), manifest anything but international co-operation.

Following these

casualties, co-operation between the flag State and the coastal or port State fails even
before it is conceived. These issues warrant further discussion.
2.2.1

The status of the IMO Code

Section 3 of the IMO Code is very clear in that the extent of its application depends
on the national law of the state involved in a casualty14. The supremacy given to
national law is understandable because the IMO Code is a Resolution, i.e. a soft law
or para-droit.

13

See I. Middleton, Another Fine Mess, (2003) at pp. 15-17.

14

See Section 3 of Annex 1 to IMO Resolution A.849(20), Code for the Investigation of Marine
Casualties and Incidents, (IMO, 1997c).

6

Soft law is “incorporated within soft instruments” and includes recommendations,
resolutions and even final acts of international diplomatic conferences15. In view of
soft law not being prescriptive in nature and therefore not legally binding, these
instruments do not impose legal obligations but rather project the objectives which
need to be reached in the future. It is interesting to note that the relation between the
softness of the instrument and the softness of the contents is in direct proportion16.
Thus, the character of the IMO Code, being not legally binding, implies that it may
either be ignored or simply hinged on the will of political masters.
Some believe that the IMO Code does not work in most instances due to legal
impediments within the legal systems of other States17. It is also indicated that the
status of the IMO Code, a voluntary guideline, is indeed an inherent weakness18.
Notwithstanding, when referring to soft law, Mukherjee heightens that “in a strict
legal sense, {soft law} may not be binding, but possesses a persuasive character”19.
So much so that he even refers to the International Safety Management (ISM) Code,
which was an IMO Resolution (i.e. soft law) but was eventually incorporated in
Chapter IX of the SOLAS 1974 Convention, transforming it into hard law. Hence,
what Mukherjee remarks, reflects exactly what D’Amato stated much earlier i.e. soft
law projects the objectives, which need to be reached in the future.

The

transformation to hard law therefore depends on the political will and priorities of the
IMO Member States20.
15

See A. D’Amato, Soft law, (2001) at p. 56. A. D’Amato is a Professor of Law at Northwestern
University, Chicago, United States of America (US).

16

A. D’Amato, ibid.

17

Personal communication with D. Drummond March 21, 2002. D. Drummond is former Director of
the Bahamas Maritime Authority. D. J. Sheetz, Executive Vice President of Vanuatu Maritime
Services Limited does not share this pessimistic view at all and declares that the IMO Code “has
been a resounding success”. Personal communication with D. J. Sheetz April 16, 2003.

18

Personal communication with F. L. Wiswall May 05, 2003. Professor Wiswall is the Vice President
of the Comité Maritime International (CMI).

19

P. K. Mukherjee, Maritime Legislation, 2002 at pp. 118-119.

20

It is very important to point out that not all the Codes emanating from IMO are soft law. As
opposed to the ISM Code, which was initially an IMO Assembly Resolution before being
incorporated into the SOLAS 1974 Convention, the International Code for the Security of Ships and

7

One maritime administration comments that if the IMO Code has an inherent
weakness, then it was anticipated even during the drafting stages21.

Given the

accuracy of this view, then this statement carries a very serious implication. Any
agreement will impose no responsibility on the parties involved, if the same parties
had negotiated with the assumption in mind that there would be no legal obligations
but a “{sole intention} to express shared values, interests, or desires and uncertain
hopes”22. Moreover, the parties involved “assume that their freedom of action will in
no way be restricted”23. The IMO Code is no exception. For instance, the language
used is lenient and the word ‘should’ is used throughout the entire document instead
of ‘shall’, the latter being used in law-making treaties. This is also particularly
pertinent when a document is intended to impose a legal obligation on the parties
involved.
The views mentioned above seem to suggest that although there is an implied
persuasive character, however, it is the political will and the priorities of IMO
Member States that determine the extent to which they implement the IMO Code;
from totally ignoring it to an unconditional implementation.

One scholar even

remarks that the term soft law has attracted ‘soft responsibility’, as opposed to the
responsibilities imposed on parties, signatory to an international convention24.
In this respect, however, academic writers and (very interestingly) even politicians
themselves, do not entirely concede that soft law should be ignored simply because it
carries no legal weight.

for Port Facilities (ISPS Code) was adopted by a Diplomatic Conference on Maritime Security at
IMO in December 2002. By incorporating it into the SOLAS 1974 Convention, this new Code will
be immediately transformed into hard law when it enters into force, without ever being a Resolution
or soft law.
21

D. J. Sheetz, supra note 17.

22

See H. Hillgenberg, A Fresh Look at Soft Law, (1999) at p. 507. H. Hillgenberg is the Ambassador
of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Republic of Ireland.

23

H. Hillgenberg, ibid.

24

A. D’Amato, supra note 15 at p. 57.

8

2.2.1.1 The other standpoint of soft law
When adopting Assembly Resolution 1169(1998), the Council of Europe’s
Parliamentary Assembly recognised that soft law should not be taken very lightly
because “…it has proved its worth as a source of inspiration for national legislation
and local initiatives alike, and has paved the way for the negotiation of stricter and
more binding agreements”25.
If one had to apply this school of thought to IMO and its Member States, it would
mean that although, for instance, resolutions per se do not create international law,
however, they may be considered to be the first step towards this process. This is
because they have the potential of guiding and coordinating cooperation between
IMO Member States. Furthermore, the term “more binding agreement” seems to
point to the existence of some sort of a lesser binding power, which could well be the
moral or ethical obligation derived from the persuasive character of the instrument.
The importance of soft law was also highlighted by Jackson during a debate in the
UK Parliament on a draft EU Directive. Jackson explained that although IMO
Resolutions are adopted on the basis that they are non-mandatory, however, “…there
is an implicit presumption that IMO Members would implement agreed Resolutions.
Indeed, a number of Resolutions have subsequently been made mandatory by IMO
itself”26.
This is a very valid point and one has to remark that during the discussions of these
instruments, delegations still negotiate with extreme caution, as if they had before
them the draft text of treaty law27. It is therefore evident that the negotiations still

25

Resolution 1169(1998) was adopted on September 24, 1998 and relates to The Oceans: State of the
Marine Environment and New Trends in International Law of the Sea. See Council of Europe
(1998), Section 17.

26

See UK Parliament, Roll-on/Roll-off Passenger Ferries, (1998). G. Jackson is the UK
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of the Environment, Transport and the
Regions.

27

A. D’Amato, supra note 15.

9

take into consideration the persuasive character and that in the future, the instrument
may become mandatory under international law28.
Hillgenberg concurs that there is no justification to overlook soft law29. He cites
Klabbers, who states that rather than a loophole, soft law serves, inter alia, as a •

Framework for confidence-building between negotiating States;

•

Stimulation for further development of the instrument; and as a

•

Creation of a flexible regime, which blends well with the fact that the
instrument is still in its developing stages.

2.2.2

Spontaneous reactions30

Spontaneous reactions have very serious implications, not least on the
implementation of the IMO Code. Since the implementation of the latter is an
expression of motivation towards safety and environmental protection, spontaneous
reactions serve as a telltale sign that the implementation of the IMO Code, if any, is
not adequate.

Furthermore, as it is explained in the following sections of this

chapter, spontaneous reactions create a vicious circle as they may well lead to further
casualties.
Spontaneous reactions are the result of either a direct or a perceived public outcry in
the wake of a very serious casualty. It is almost certain that when there is public
outcry, the government of the State in question will resort to some action, irrelevant
to whether it is adequate or not31.

28

A. D’Amato, ibid.

29

H. Hillgenberg, supra note 22 at p.501.

30

For the purpose of this dissertation, spontaneous reactions are defined as reactions lacking adequate
appraisal and analysis of ensuing consequences.

31

See F. J. Iarossi, (2003). F. J. Iarossi is the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the American
Bureau of Shipping (ABS).
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It appears that following all cases of severe pollution, the media has never
encouraged a safety investigation in accordance with the IMO Code32.

To the

contrary, it has influenced public outcry, which in turn has instigated spontaneous
reactions. In reality, the public is not aware of the situation in the industry33. This
therefore implies that the pressure put on politicians to resort to some action may not
be adequate and the spontaneous reactions will be far from addressing the real
underlying factors of that casualty34.
Hours after the Erika casualty, MMA requested the French Bureau Enquêtes
Accidents Mer (BEA-MER) to co-operate, share any evidence available and conduct
an investigation, in line with the spirit of the IMO Code. Not only did BEA-MER
brush aside co-operation, but the IMO Code was never taken into consideration or
mentioned by the French investigators. Furthermore, precisely 32 days following the
casualty, BEA-MER issued an interim technical report which tackled, amongst
others, the flooding sequence following the bulkhead and side shell failure of the
tanker, and also the inadequacies of MMA35.

The report included several

contributing factors to the casualty and also recommendations to prevent future
similar accidents.
When taking the opportunity to comment on the Prestige casualty, Rear Admiral
Lang was reported saying that rather than appreciating the importance of casualty
investigation, the industry is agile enough to press what he calls the “panic
buttons”36. Lang cannot be more precise. Following the Prestige casualty, the
French President Jacques Chirac was reported requesting “draconian measures”. The
32

Research carried out by this writer.

33

J. L. Veiga, Safety Culture in Shipping, (2002) at p. 22.

34

The same applies to the press media, which is the main source of general public influence and
therefore also acts as a pressure point on politicians. However, many are those who in the recent
past have accused the media in general that rather than projecting the true image of the industry,
they project the latter as a complex system where anything but thorough safety initiative exists.

35

Appendix 2 to this dissertation contains a scanned image of the interim technical report cover sheet
issued by BEA-MER on January 13, 2000.

36

See “Pressing the Wrong Buttons”, (2003) at p. 7.
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EU joined his bandwagon and initiated the implementation of stricter legislation;
well before any casualty investigation report had yet been completed37.
Many influential persons in the industry have expressed their views against
spontaneous reactions and additional regulations, either because they are a sign that
the role of safety investigations is being made redundant or because of economic
expediency. Making an obvious reference to the Vice-President of the European
Commission, Woods acknowledges, “…it is difficult to persuade a politician with a
crusade…of practical or technical considerations”38. It is also deemed that after all,
politicians are not shipping experts and there are occasions where they are badly
advised, resulting in additional or tighter regulations39.
The problem with additional or tighter regulations can be viewed from at least two
perspectives; namely safety and economics. Whilst leaving the economics aspect to
economists, it must be pointed out that a wrong political decision taken in the
aftermath of a casualty, can be easily viewed as a latent failure at the decisionmaking level, meaning another weakness in the barriers, which should prevent
casualties. Thus, a spontaneous reaction can backfire, create a compliance culture40

37

B. Ryes, Not Again, (2002) at p. 1.

38

See “A Case for Education”, (2003) at p. 5. R. Woods is the President of the UK Chamber of
Shipping.

39

See D. Osler, O’Neil urges IMO Flag Power, (2003) at p. 1. During this speech, Secretary-General
O’Neil implied that the double-hull issue was a political cover-up and that it is only a matter of time
until the maritime industry will suffer the first casualty involving a double-hull tanker. It can be
immediately perceived that Secretary-General O’Neil’s speech has cast aspersions on the regime’s
hasty decision to phase out single-hull tankers, rather than addressing the root causes of the
accident.

40

David Wright, Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) Principal Surveyor at the Formal Safety
Assessment (FSA) Branch identifies two hazards related to the compliance culture: massive amount
of regulations that can lead the operator of a complex system to simply comply with rules, without
considering the implications on safety. Furthermore, the operator may assume that if he complies
with rules, then the operation is safe, which is, however, not always the case. See D. Wright,
Formal Safety Assessment: Its Role in Marine Safety, (1999) at p. 2. This is what Jens Rasmussen
defines in his taxonomy as Rule-Based errors.
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and can become antagonistic to the objective of the IMO Code, which is the
prevention of similar future casualties41.
2.2.3

Political interference

Political interference may be another stumbling block during the implementation
process because it stymies the spirit of the IMO Code. The turbulent atmosphere,
which may be created by several politicians in the aftermath of very serious
casualties, is far from desirable and ideal for the implementation of the IMO Code.
No wonder that during the Prestige events, “politicians…{were} spitting with
rage…”42. In addition to spontaneous reactions, politicians’ rage is expressed in
finger pointing and a blaming culture.
Finger pointing not only goes against the purpose of safety investigations but it also
blocks the co-operation process. In the executive summary of the MMA report into
the loss of the Erika it was remarked that further to the lack of information made
available to the flag Administration, the incarceration of the master by the French
authorities for ten consecutive days, might have had a bearing on the findings of the
casualty investigation43. The lack of co-operation was also expressed by the Maltese
delegation to the Marine Environment Protection Committee’s (MEPC) forty-fifth
Session when the Erika report was officially presented to IMO44.
Almost three years later, the master of the Prestige met worse treatment and spent
several months in jail. The flag State, in this case the Bahamas, also reported to the
seventy-sixth Session of the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) that its investigators
41

See IMO, supra note 14. This means that the implementation of the IMO Code becomes redundant.
Even worse, the European Commission Vice-President was reported describing the quick phasingout of single-hull tankers from EU waters as “…spectacular steps ahead…and I am very happy to
see these crucial initiatives finally approved…!”. See R. Hailey & J. Frank, European MP’s Vote
for Faster Phase-out, (2003) at p. 1.

42

See “Prestige Sparks Déjà Vu”, (2002) at p. 7.

43

Malta Maritime Authority, Report of the Investigation into the Loss of the Motor Tanker ERIKA on
Sunday 12 December 1999, 2000.

44

MEPC 45/20, Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on its Forty-Fifth Session,
(IMO, 2000b).
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were not permitted to interview the master by the coastal State authorities45. This is
a right, which is granted by international conventions to which the coastal State is
also a Party.
It takes no scholar to realise that the frustration of the spirit of the IMO Code is very
clear in at least the following respects •

Failure to co-operate;

•

Failure to share available evidence;

•

Prohibiting access to key witnesses; and

•

Taking blunt reactive measures, without considering the safety
investigation findings.

In opposition to the objective of the IMO Code, it is virtually expected that in some
way or another, an investigation will determine blame. So much so that comments
on the forthcoming report compiled by the European Parliament’s rapporteur on the
Prestige, claiming “neutrality and technicality”, have raised many eyebrows,
especially after the stand taken by the EU46. Maclntosh-Murray and Wei Choo cite

45

M. Grey, Bahamas Government Protests to Spain on Treatment of Mangouras, (2002b) at p. 1.

46

See B. Reyes, EU Report to Back Industry Line on Action over Prestige, (2003b) at p. 1. A draft
copy of the report prepared by Sterckx, the European Parliament’s rapporteur on the Prestige, was
finalised at a time when the writing of this dissertation was in progress. The report was not
available to this writer and therefore the genuineness and accuracy of the extensive coverage by
Lloyd’s List issue of June 10, 2003 cannot be determined.
Also see R. Hailey, Sterckx Calls for Steeper Owner Pollution Liability, (2003) at p. 1. Hailey
reported that Sterckx’s report recommends the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) to, inter
alia, investigate specific hazards related to double-hull tankers. This recommendation only
confirms that wrong decisions constitute a latent failure within the system and suggests that the EU
missed the boat altogether when it insisted on a spontaneous reaction to phase out single-hull
tankers. Chapter 4 of this dissertation shows that risk assessment should be a proactive exercise and
not addressed as a retrospective approach. Scientifically and logically, it makes no sense that the
EU jumped the gun, stuck to its decision to phase out single-hull tankers and now is being
recommended to assess the risk related to its political judgment. Moreover, the report also
expresses concern on the incarceration of the Prestige master, which is looked upon as a direct blow
to the revival of the seafaring career. Whilst there is no doubt that this concern is genuine, the
report should express equal concern on the fact that his incarceration simply compromised the ongoing safety investigation by the Bahamas Maritime Authority.
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Douglas in their paper who asserts, “blaming is a way of manning the gates through
which all information has to pass”47.
On the occasion of World Maritime Day 1997, ‘IMO News’48 referred to Allinson
who expressed his grave concern on blaming and scapegoating as follows The problem with the technique of scapegoating is not only that it may be unfair to the
scapegoat but that by thinking that one has discovered the cause of the disaster, one is
alleviated from the responsibility of searching for the entire constellation of factors.

Although this issue of ‘IMO News’ was published just months before the IMO
Assembly adopted Resolution 849, recent casualties have shown that at least when
severe pollution occurs, the IMO Code is not being implemented to an extent which
would enable the industry to benefit from the safety investigation49.

47

A. Maclntosh-Murray & C. Wei Choo, Information Failures and Catastrophes: What Can We
Learn by Linking Information Studies and Disaster Research?, (2002).

48

See IMO News, “Optimum Maritime Safety Demands a Focus on People”, (IMO, 1997b) at pp. iiv.

49

Leading opponents of the ‘blame culture’ are not suggesting that society transforms itself into
anarchy. As compared to a no ‘blame culture’, Professor Reason instead suggests a ‘just culture’,
believing that such a society is more realistic and credible. What Reason recommends is a culture,
where punishments are only given in circumstances where casualties would have resulted from
Mens Rea offences. (Mens Rea means the mental element). He also emphasises that such cases are
only a minority, the rest being unsafe acts and decisions where the determination of blame is only
undesired and to the detriment of safety. See J. Reason, Managing the Risks of Organizational
Accidents, 1997 at p. 205.
Furthermore, it neither means that a safety investigation refrains from reporting criminal offences.
Enforcing the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, as
modified by the Protocol of 1978 relating thereto (MARPOL 1973/78) may require the port or
coastal State to report a wilful discharge of oil or any polluting substance to the flag State.
However, once an alleged criminal offence has been reported to the competent authorities, the
casualty investigators should not involve themselves any further.
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2.2.4

Possible rationale to spontaneous reactions and the blame culture

Although scholars and academic writers are cautioning the industry that spontaneous
reactions and a blame culture are neither ideal nor desirable, however, politicians
persist with their hasty decisions.
It is submitted that Reason has indirectly explained the rationale behind this
behaviour, which goes against the objective, purpose and spirit of the IMO Code. He
suggests that there are instances in the aftermath of an accident where politicians
decide to blame or prescribe new regulations even if they are aware that such actions
will not prevent future accidents. He indicates that in addition to being seen as doing
something, “blaming those at the sharp end deflects blame from the organization as a
whole”50.
One other major reason why several politicians choose to ignore the IMO Code is
because they find it difficult to believe in its potential, as opposed to those countries
where it was ensured that the IMO Code is implemented and the safety investigation
is given the same priority as any other investigation.
The IMO Code provides the framework for safety investigations and its purpose is
achieved when the casualty investigation report is published, identifies the
contributing factors and gives recommendations without apportioning blame or
determining liability. The report should serve as the bedrock of a safety culture and
it is precisely here that the problem lies. It has already been established that for
various reasons, following major casualties, politicians who strongly believe in the
blame culture, generally demand the unachievable. Reason deems that the positive
impact of these measures towards a new safety culture is negligible. In fact he
eloquently suggests that safety culture needs to be constructed and “…{is} not
something that springs up ready-made from the organizational equivalent of a near50

J. Reason, ibid. at p. 193. The view expressed by Reason was later echoed by Iarossi. See F. J.
Iarossi, supra note 31. Actually, many regard the extreme position taken by the Spanish
Government in arresting and charging the master of the Prestige of several offences, as a political
manoeuvre, to allay the Spanish people’s fears about their Government’s lack of appropriate action
to mitigate the pollution on the Galician beaches.
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death experience, rather it emerges gradually from the persistent and successful
application of practical and down-to-earth measures”51.
Schröder considers spontaneous reactions and the outcome of thorough casualty
investigation reports as “short-term needs versus long-term interest”52. He indicates
that in view of the long time gap (sometimes even years) from the identification of
root cause failures to the agreement on justified measures/solutions to prevent the
casualty from happening again, politicians tend to resort to short-term measures. As
he rightly points out, this should only be a temporary measure, which then has to be
reviewed once the corrective actions are identified.
However, his point seems to be inexact because whilst admitting that this is not often
the case, he still defines these measures as “short-term”. For instance, the phasing
out of the single-hull tankers from EU waters following the Erika casualty and their
subsequent accelerated phasing out following the sinking of the Prestige, are nothing
less than long-term measures. These are measures, which have been called upon by
politicians in general, based on no scientific justifications, without even waiting for
the publication of the casualty investigation reports and rather than being short-lived,
are irrevocable. Far from an ideal implementation of the IMO Code!
As one scholar points out, a reactive approach may be justified, subject to the
condition that it addresses the important contributing factors53.

This implies,

however, that an ideal safety policy can only be adopted after the safety investigation
report has been published.

51

Ibid. at p. 192.

52

J.-U. Schröder, The Human Element (HE) in Marine Casualties – Are We Prepared to Address the
Real Issues?, (2003) at p. 2.

53

See H. N. Psaraftis, Maritime Safety: To Be or Not to Be Proactive, (2003) at p. 6. H. N. Psaraftis
is a Professor at the National Technical University, Athens, Greece.

17

2.3

Overcoming the Political Scepticism to Advance the Implementation of
the IMO Code

So far cases have been referred to, where it is evident that the IMO Code is hardly
being implemented. In addition, the possible reasons why this is so have been
addressed. The repercussions of wrong political decisions were also highlighted and
it has been established that depending on the will of the IMO Member States, the
implementation of the IMO Code can be further advanced54.
2.3.1

Breaking free the blame cycle

Politicians need to understand that the very fundamental premise on which the IMO
Code is to be implemented is that the process absolutely does not foster
scapegoating.

As Reason puts it: “{t}here is one obvious but psychological

significant difference between ourselves, the retrospective judges, and the people
whose decisions, actions or inactions led to a disaster; we know how things were
going to turn out, they did not”55.
Sir Neville Purvis asserted that one should not emphasise “…on the final garnish
{instead of} the basic ingredients of a lethal brew which has already been long in the
cooking”56. This very important remark complements Reason’s belief that, inter
alia, there is an interaction of factors beyond the control of the scapegoat and it will

54

Away from the scrutiny of the eyes of the general public, the attitude of a State is another factor,
which together with the political will, regulates the implementation of the IMO Code. On May 02,
2003, a collision in the Black Sea involving the Maltese ship Junior M and the Spanish tanker Nuria
Tapias resulted in the loss of the Maltese ship. Discussing the co-operation process, Captain
Zerafa, Technical Manager of the Merchant Shipping Directorate of the MMA stated that the other
flag State was very reluctant to co-operate and only after reporting the appalling situation to the EU
that correspondence trickled in Spanish, although co-operation is still at the barest minimum.
Discussion with J. Zerafa May 29, 2003.
Captain Dietrich of the German Federal Bureau of Maritime Casualty Investigation recalls a similar
experience where they requested Egypt (the flag State) to co-operate in accordance with the IMO
Code but all they received was a “friendly reply without any information”. Personal
communication with D. Dietrich May 14, 2003.

55

J. Reason, Human Error, 1990 at p. 215.

56

See B. Toft & S. Reynolds, Learning from Disasters: A Management Approach, 1997 at p. vii. Sir
Neville Purvis is the Director General of the British Safety Council.
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not be easy for the operator of a complex system to control actions which he did not
intend to execute57.
The above views lead to the fact that politicians may be constrained to spontaneous
reactions, which then will be destined to stay because if otherwise, they may fear that
their sovereign people will accuse them of political ‘U-turns’. Reason argues that it
is true that operators of complex systems frequently do make mistakes, especially
when trying to recover the system to its normal operational status. However, that
situation would have materialised in the first place because of latent defects within
the general system58.
This would therefore mean that the mistakes committed by the operator are a
consequence of latent failures and should be viewed as a manifestation that indeed,
weaknesses had existed in the system since it was a mere sketch, pinned to the
drawing board. Hollnagel echoes Reason’s view and defines the human beings at the
sharp end as “people who were caught between the demands of complex technology
and the inadequate means they were given to achieve their tasks”59.
Neither politicians nor anybody in the maritime industry should have a narrow vision
and interpret the “inadequate means” as referring only to an old corroded single-hull
tanker transporting black oil. Decisions taken with alacrity in the wake of a casualty
can also perfectly fit the “inadequate means”. Reason’s Hybrid model, adopted by
IMO as Assembly Resolution 884, clearly shows that spontaneous reactions,

57

J. Reason, supra note 49 at p. 128.

58

J. Reason, supra note 55 at p. 173.

59

E. Hollnagel, Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis Method. CREAM, 1998 at p. xiii.
Crewmembers onboard ships fall within the definition of human beings at the sharp end i.e. the
operators of a complex system. In other words, the task of seafarers is to, inter alia, meet the
demands of complex technology. However, the same complex technology is not free from
weaknesses and therefore may be susceptible to fail in the hands of those at the sharp end.
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especially if taken without even considering the casualty investigation report, may in
the long run result in latent defects at the top management level60.
2.3.2

The machinery provided by IMO

It is acknowledged that IMO is the only global forum where international cooperation may be promoted61. Observers have, however, identified at least seven
weaknesses of the Flag State Implementation (FSI) Sub-Committee, which hinder the
efforts towards the implementation of the IMO Code62. They are •

Failure

to

establish

mandatory

procedures

related

to

casualty

investigation;
•

Limited enforcement of the IMO Code;

•

IMO cannot disclose whether a flag State has submitted a report;

•

Failure to exert pressure on flag States which have failed to complete a
casualty report;

•

Unable to disseminate the findings of casualty investigations without the
consent of the flag;

•

No deadline for completing casualty investigations; and

•

Several international maritime conventions only require investigations, if
the flag State judges that the investigation may lead to an amendment in
the present regulations.

The need to provide IMO with some enforcement powers has long been sensed. In a
speech given in October 2000, Secretary-General O’Neil stressed that IMO is ready

60

See A.884(21), Amendments to the Code for the Investigation of Marine Casualties and Incidents,
(IMO, 1999).

61

Article 1(a) of the Convention establishing IMO defines the purposes of the Organization as “to
provide machinery for co-operation among Governments in the field of governmental regulation
and practices relating to technical matters of all kinds affecting shipping engaged in international
trade; to encourage and facilitate the general adoption of the highest practicable standards in matters
concerning maritime safety, efficiency of navigation and prevention and control of marine pollution
from ships”. See Focus on IMO, “Basic facts about IMO”, (IMO, 2000a) at p. 1.

62

See “IMO Remains Toothless and on the Fringe”, (2002).
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to respond if the necessary resources are provided63. Thus, even if the MSC seventysixth Session and the MEPC forty-eighth Session have adopted MSC/Circ.1058 /
MEPC/Circ.400, which relates directly to the better implementation of the IMO
Code64; with little enforcement power, it still comes down to the political will of the
IMO Member States.
During the eleventh Session of the FSI Sub-Committee, Canada, Denmark and New
Zealand submitted document FSI 11/7, requesting the Sub-Committee to consider
transferring the content of IMO Resolution A.847(20) into a ‘Flag State
Implementation Code’ (FSI Code), with the intent of making it mandatory at some
later stage65. As it would have been expected, the draft FSI Code, annexed to
document FSI 11/7, referred to casualty investigations and made specific reference to
the IMO Code in a footnote. It has to be pointed out that the reference to the IMO
Code in a footnote does not mean that it will become mandatory, should the FSI
Code enter into force66. This means nothing less than a direct reliance on the
political will of the IMO Member States.

63

See W. O’Neil, (2000). In so doing, Secretary-General O’Neil also pointed out that the waiverclause inserted in several international maritime conventions, only requiring investigations when
deemed possible to amend regulations, should be removed.

64

MSC/Circ.1058 / MEPC/Circ.400, Interim Guidelines to Assist flag States and Other Substantially
Interested States to Establish and Maintain an Effective Framework for Consultation and CoOperation in Marine Casualty Investigations, (IMO, 2002c).

65

Enhancing global maritime safety and protection of the marine environment is the sole objective of
the proposed FSI Code. See Responsibilities of Governments and Measures to Encourage Flag
State Compliance. Draft revised resolution A.847(20), (IMO, 2003a).

66

Mukherjee adds that should the FSI Code enter into force, the application of the IMO Code will
only become mandatory if the IMO Code itself becomes mandatory through the necessary actions at
the international level and then, through corresponding legislative action at the national level. Thus,
it is up to the political will of governments to take the opportunity and insert the IMO Code in their
national legislation at the same time that they insert the FSI Code. However, putting an enabling
clause in the national legislation to enforce the FSI Code will not mean that the IMO Code has also
become mandatory. Views expressed by P. K. Mukherjee in a personal interview June 06, 2003.
Countries such as Australia, Canada and the UK have either incorporated the IMO Code in their
national principal legislation or drafted new subordinate legislation based on the IMO Code.
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2.3.3

The EU and regional agreements

Article 12 of EU Council Directive 1999/35/EC refers to accident investigations and
in this respect, sets out obligations on EU Member States, even if solely limited to
ro-ro ferries and high-speed passenger crafts. The Article makes direct reference to
the importance of implementing the IMO Code, although it only presents a blueprint
on how co-operation shall be achieved67.
Regulation (EC) No. 1406/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council,
established EMSA on June 27, 2002. Article 2e defines that one of the tasks of
EMSA is the facilitation of co-operation between EU Member States and the
Commission.

The facilitation of co-operation will automatically support EU

Member States during the investigation process68. Although in its infancy, once
matured, EMSA may help assist the implementation of the IMO Code, hopefully
brushing aside the spontaneous reactions and the blame culture mentioned earlier.
The fact that the maritime industry needs a global solution to promote an even better
implementation of the IMO Code does not in anyway mean that there is no room for
regional agreements, especially if the IMO Code is used as the core of that
agreement.

Per se, that would signify that parties involved are committed to

implement the IMO Code, rather than resorting to spontaneous reactions and
scapegoating69.

67

Council Directive 1999/35/EC, A System of Mandatory Surveys for the Safe Operation of Regular
Ro-Ro Ferry and High-Speed Passenger Craft Services, (EU, 1999).

68

Regulation (EC) No. 1406/2002 of the European Parliament and the Council, (EC, 2002).

69

In addition to implementing the IMO Code, regional agreements also serve the purpose of
harmonising the legislation of the parties; which will also harmonise different philosophies in
casualty investigation. (The consequences of different philosophies are addressed in more detail in
chapter 3 of this dissertation). Denmark, France, Germany, the Republic of Korea and Sweden
submitted FSI 10/9/1 to the tenth Session of the FSI Sub-Committee and referred to Section X of
the HELCOM Copenhagen Declaration, adopted September 10, 2001 and which relates to the IMO
Code and establishment of common procedures. See FSI 10/9/1, Casualty Statistics and
Investigations. Guidelines to Assist Flag States and other States with a Substantial Interest in the
Investigation of Marine Casualties to Establish and Maintain an Effective Framework for
Consultation and Co-operation, (IMO, 2002a).
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2.3.4

Other international fora

Two of the most influential international fora are the Marine Accident International
Investigators’ Forum (MAIIF) and the International Transportation Safety
Association (ITSA)70. Both fora share the same principles of co-operation and their
respective members have supported the adoption of the IMO Code and its
implementation. Such fora should be warmly welcomed as a source of learning from
the practices of others, especially those who, by adopting the IMO Code, have
overcome political stumbling blocks during casualty investigation.
2.3.5

Enforcing the IMO Code at municipal and international levels

Soft law may be enforced in a “soft manner”71. This compares well with IMO
Assembly Resolution A.912(22), which is the ‘Self-Assessment of Flag State
Performance’. The self-assessment form has some weaknesses in its current format,
but it may serve as an eye opener for a flag State that drags its feet, not least in the
area of casualty investigation, as it might also influence the public opinion vis-à-vis
the flag State concerned. The IMO Model Audit Scheme discussed by MSC during
its seventy-sixth and seventy-seventh Sessions is also being designed to assess how
effectively Member States are complying with international conventions72 and
indirectly may therefore determine the extent of implementation of the IMO Code.
In attempting to avoid circumventing safety investigations, civil servants may also
encourage politicians to understand that their actions should not frustrate the
implementation of the IMO Code. This can be achieved by giving effect to the IMO
Code through national maritime legislation, meaning that IMO Member States can
incorporate it into their national maritime legislation and transform it into hard law.
The same applied to the International Maritime Dangerous Goods (IMDG) Code,

70

Whilst MAIIF membership is open to all states, participation at ITSA is only limited to states,
which have established independent casualty investigating bodies.

71

See H. Hillgenberg, supra note 22 at p. 511.

72

See IMO News, “Casualty Investigations – New Guidelines Approved”, (IMO, 2003b) at p. 16.
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which many States incorporated into their national maritime legislation, even before
it became mandatory73.
However, although a government will then ensure a more effective implementation
of the IMO Code (and its spirit of no blame and spontaneous reactions), its
incorporation into national maritime legislation without it being in force
internationally, may still not bring harmonisation in its implementation. This is also
true, given the fact that the IMO Code has a very serious limitation in that it only
applies “as far as national laws allow”74.
The solution to the above problem was expressed by Lord McNair who brings to
light a fundamental principle of international law – a principle that gives
international law supremacy over municipal law75. He states that When a State enters into obligation of an international character, it is not allowed to
adduce any inadequacy or incompatibility in its own legal system, or any of its
legislative or executive acts, as an excuse for the non-performance of the international
obligation.

Followed to its logical conclusion, Lord McNair’s statement becomes a reality if, for
instance, the IMO Code had to be made mandatory through the SOLAS 1974
Convention76. Whilst IMO emphasises its global role, Wiswall concludes that the
MSC is unwilling to amend SOLAS 1974 Convention, Regulation I/21; meaning that
73

P. K. Mukherjee, supra note 19 at p. 118.

74

See IMO, supra note 14.

75

Lord A. D. McNair, The Law of Treaties, 1961 at p. 761.

76

According to Mukherjee, for a code to be made mandatory, it cannot remain as a stand-alone
instrument and is thus made mandatory through an amendment of the parent instrument. SOLAS
1974 Convention is considered to be the appropriate parent instrument vis-à-vis the IMO Code since
the Convention has two dimensions which are compatible with the spirit of the IMO Code: safety
and environmental protection. (With the newly adopted ISPS Code being considered as a
component of SOLAS 1974 Convention, security is the third dimension, which has been added to
the Convention). Views expressed by P. K. Mukherjee in a personal interview August 22, 2003.
Incorporating the IMO Code into the SOLAS 1974 Convention would also mean that non-State
Parties to the Convention, even if they are IMO Member States, would technically have no
obligation whatsoever to implement the IMO Code. This does not, however, prevent them from
taking the initiative to incorporate the IMO Code into their national maritime legislation.
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it would be inconsistent for a modified mandatory version of the IMO Code in a new
SOLAS chapter77.
The rationale behind Wiswall’s thoughts might be due to the ‘explicit acceptance’;
the single procedure that can amend SOLAS Chapter I. It may take years before two
thirds of the Contracting Governments accept the amendments to SOLAS Regulation
I/2178.

Observers in the maritime industry acknowledge that this is a serious

weakness in IMO’s internal operating mechanism79.
On the other hand, at least one maritime authority is not very optimistic that the IMO
Code will become mandatory in the near future. For this to happen, it envisages
every state giving up its sovereignty with regard to maritime matters80. This view
does not, however, reflect entirely what is already happening at IMO, where Member
States on the ‘white list’, pertaining to the 1978 Standards of Training, Certification
and Watchkeeping for Seafarers Convention, as amended in 1995 (STCW) have
sacrificed some of their sovereignty.
The IMO Model Audit Scheme is another indication that IMO is tackling sensitive
issues head-on and there are already calls for mandatory auditing of flag States,
meaning a further step towards the relinquishment of complete sovereignty.
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cannot be applied to amend the articles of the SOLAS 1974 Convention and SOLAS Chapter I. See
IMO, ibid.
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2.3.6

The IMO Code as customary international law

The basis of customary international law is state practice. Customary law is often
codified through treaty law. One writer subscribes to this option with optimism
because as distinguished from treaty law, which is contractual in nature, customary
international law is binding on all States81.

2.4

The Blame Culture and Safety by Compulsion

The chapter endeavoured to demonstrate that whilst soft law may be seen as a
weakness or a loophole through which politicians may avoid implementing the IMO
Code, scholars and academic writers have adamant standpoints that this should not
be the case. The main reason rests on the persuasive character and potential of soft
law as a source of inspiration.
Figure 2.4a attempts to portray the frustration of safety investigations (and hence the
implementation of the IMO Code), should one resort to impulsive decisions in the
wake of a very serious casualty82. Spontaneous reactions very often result in fallible
decisions, leading to the build-up of latent failures; defined as weaknesses in the
system’s defences. Spontaneous reactions defy the purpose of the IMO Code (i.e.
the identification of causal factors) and are antagonistic to its objective of preventing
similar casualties from happening in the future.
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See M. J. Sobey, International Cooperation in Maritime Casualty Investigations: An Analysis of
IMO Resolution A.637(16), (1993) at p. 22. Expanding on the existence of a rule of customary
international law, Churchill & Lowe refer to the Orthodox legal theory, which requires the proof of
existence of two elements. The first element is the general and consistent practice by States. The
second element is the opinio juris sive necessitates i.e. the first element has to be followed with a
sense of legal obligation, which does not go against the norms of international law. They also
remark that customary international law is not binding on States “{which} persistently object to an
emerging rule of customary international law”, i.e. States which claim “the status of persistent
objectors”. R. R. Churchill & A. V. Lowe, The Law of the Sea, 1999 at p. 7. For a discussion on
how a legal obligation may arise from or transform into customary international law, see J. G.
Starke, Introduction to International Law, 1989 at pp. 35-41.
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A blaming culture frustrates the spirit of the IMO Code because it impedes cooperation, sharing of evidence and access to key witnesses. A blame policy will
have a detrimental effect on the findings of the safety investigation, and creates the
dangerous potential of not addressing the root causes in an adequate manner.
In emphasising the determination of blame, politicians suggest that the most
important issue is the public perception rather than the outcome of the safety
investigation carried out in line with the IMO Code. In so doing, there is a restrained
expression towards a constructive and systematic build-up of safety, based on lessons
learnt.
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CHAPTER 3 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE INVESTIGATOR
AND THE REGULATOR
If for the purpose of this chapter, certain reactions by politicians described in chapter
two are omitted (because it has already been established that these political actions
do not favour safety investigations), then a State may conduct a)

A safety investigation with the sole objective of determining the causes,
responsibilities,

contributing

factors

and

prevention

of

similar

recurrences; and
b)

An investigation with the same objective as in (a) but which may also
establish blame, resulting in disciplinary actions against seafarers who
are held responsible83.

This chapter attempts to analyse why a minority of IMO Member States have created
a separate legal entity from the maritime administrator i.e. the regulator, with
completely different infrastructure and responsibilities, and with a sole objective of
determining the causes and contributing factors, whilst others, for various reasons,
have opted not to. As would be expected, IMO Member States embracing these two
different practices claim that their respective organisation is well fitted for the
purpose, even within the spirit of the IMO Code and achieving well-acceptable
results. Their different and at times contradictory views are also studied.
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As far as this chapter is concerned, it is irrelevant whether the disciplinary actions are initiated
within the structure of the same investigating body, a different body or some form of inquiry or
formal investigation. Such procedures depend on the legal regime established in each particular
country. The issue remains that in the maritime industry, there are two distinct philosophies, which
in practice are translated in either option (a) or (b).
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3.1

Independent versus Non-Independent Investigating Bodies

3.1.1

Defining an independent investigating body

An independent investigating body is any body which “has the ability to plan and
conduct accident investigations without having direct contact with the corresponding
government administrative body”84.
It can be further said that the establishment of all independent investigating bodies,
followed the exercise carried out in the US, when the National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB) was set up in 1966. As early as 1973, the then retired Judge-advocate
General, Brigadier-General McLearn had concluded in his report that the “creation of
an independent Transportation Accident Investigation and Safety Board {in Canada}
would be the only effective means…”85.
3.1.2

The lawyers’ and industry’s perspective towards the investigating body

One of the realities, which justifies the separation of safety investigations from the
regulator (in implementing the IMO Code), is the lawyers’ and industry’s
perspectives at the scene of the accident or the place where the surviving crew of the
ship has been landed.
Russo refers in detail to what a lawyer can expect to encounter at an accident scene86.
In particular, he refers to the United States Coast Guard (USCG) and cautions that
the latter has at least a dual role87; to determine the cause of the accident (and take
corrective actions) and forward any evidence related to criminal liability to the US
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P. Caridis, State-of-the-Art in Marine Casualty. Reporting, Data Processing and Analysis in EU
Member States, the IMO and the US, (1999a) at p. 1.
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See B. M. Deschênes, supra note 5 at p. 145.
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T. Russo, Criminal Liability in Maritime Accidents, (1994) at p. 6.
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In the case of a pollution accident, the USCG also has the role to activate the contingency plan and
mitigate the pollution. However, this function is not related to the subject of this dissertation and
will not be discussed any further.
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Attorney General88. He continues to caution that a lawyer must be careful with a
USCG investigator, who should be dealt with in the same manner as the State Police
or even the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Very explicitly, he comments
that …once it becomes apparent that the {USCG} investigators will not rule out that a
crime has been committed, it then becomes the job of the defence lawyer present to
protect his clients' rights and certainly not to actively assist investigators to gather
incriminating evidence…no one on board a ship can or should be forced to speak to a
law enforcement officer investigating the cause of the mishap if there is a possibility
that the person may incriminate himself by doing so.

What Russo advises is a fundamental legal right in every society built on the
principle of democracy. Be that as it may, the purpose of a safety investigation is
fact-finding. Whether the product of a fact-finding mission supports or opposes a
particular position in subsequent proceedings, is no doubt an issue.

In many

instances, the findings may point towards blame or fault in some way. However, that
does not change the purpose of carrying out a safety investigation. It is therefore
important that a potential witness does not remain silent by simply invoking a
fundamental right. However, it is well known that this is a problem, which is easily
identified than resolved89.
Similar views were expressed much more recently. One law practitioner in New
York was very critical of the situation in the US and lamented that “…the Coast
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Past and recent casualties, which resulted in oil pollution, have shown that criminal liability may
also arise following an oil pollution accident.
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The same situation was encountered by this writer in February 2001, at La Coruna, Spain whilst
interviewing the survivors of the Maltese tanker MT Kristal. The attitude of the P&I lawyers (even
if representing the interests of the owner and not of the seafarers) present during all stages of the
interviews, fell short of co-operation with the Maltese and Spanish investigators and their main
concern was to repatriate the crew as soon as possible. In all probability, a different attitude would
have met the investigators if, rather than the regulator, an independent investigating body appeared
on the scene.

30

Guard and the Department of Justice were…contributors to the climate of fingerpointing”90.
What independent investigating bodies foster, much in their favour, is an approach
positively looked at by witnesses and analysts alike. In its findings, an independent
investigating body will never determine blame and this philosophy is reflected
throughout the investigation process, including the findings and conclusions.
Scholars such as Hollnagel are also of the view that rather than apportioning blame,
an investigation should take into consideration the sequence of events and investigate
backwards until “a reasonable set of causes” has been identified91. This approach is
compatible with the IMO Code’s objective, prescribed in Section 2.
This philosophy was exemplified in the case of Tracey Ann Renehan v.
Commonwealth of Australia [2001], where the plaintiff was injured whilst climbing
the rigging of a sail-training vessel, a casualty that was investigated by the Australian
Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB)92.

Since the Navigation (Marine Casualty)

Amendment Regulations 2001 adopted the IMO Code, the Supreme Court of the
Northern Territory of Australia declined the plaintiff’s plea to request ATSB to make
the casualty investigation documents available.
The Court held that the Navigation Regulations 2001 now reflect the IMO Code’s
aim i.e. casualty investigations are not carried out for the purpose of determining
liability and apportioning blame and therefore the investigation documents cannot be
disclosed to any person other than the witness himself. It was also clarified that the
term ‘any person’ included the court93.
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This intervention was made during the ‘Maritime Casualties Conference & Expo’, held in
November 2000. See T. Braden, MarCas. Debate and Energy Drive First Casualties Conference,
(2001) at p. 68.
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In view of their philosophy of not apportioning blame, independent investigating
bodies try to educate the public in this regard and in so doing, distinct themselves
from IMO Member States, which conduct an investigation that may lead to the
determination of blame94.

One proponent of independent investigating bodies,

expressed his reservations on the blame culture and commented that this culture is
having its toll on safety investigations. According to him, this situation is not
ameliorating safety at sea95.
This perception contrasts but binds with what Russo, from the other side of the fence,
claims to be a fundamental right to remain silent in order not to incriminate oneself96.
Lang observes that “{t}he fear of self-incrimination, or being held solely responsible
for some lapse, is having an adverse effect on people’s willingness to co-operate in
an accident investigation to determine the primary and underlying causes”97. Lang’s
concern is not only related to the fact that adversarial settings might not contribute to
safety, but is also apprehensive that such an attitude is undermining the work of his
own organisation. Gaining people’s confidence takes years of professional work and
yet, it may be jeopardised by even the slightest public perception that the
investigating body is not living up to its philosophy.
In spite of the claims made by independent investigating bodies, it does not
necessarily mean that a witness will open up spontaneously the moment he is advised
that he is releasing a statement to an independent investigating body. The casualty
investigation report into the grounding of the Bunga Teratai Satu proves precisely
the contrary98. The report illustrates how claims made by the chief mate were
94

See J. Lang, (2000b).
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J. Lang, Chief Inspector’s Forward, (2001) at p. 2. Rear Admiral J. Lang is the former Chief
Inspector of the Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB), UK.
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See section 3.1.2 above.
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J. Lang, ibid. at pp. 2-3.
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See ATSB, Independent Investigation into the Grounding of the Malaysian Flag Container Ship
Bunga Teratai Satu on Sudbury Reef, Great Barrier Reef, 02 November 2000, (2001) at p. 16.
Reference to this report is also made in chapter 4 of this dissertation and is used further in the case
study presented in Appendix 3 to this dissertation.
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inconsistent with available evidence. It notes that the claims made to the shipping
company “…{were} repeated to the {ATSB} accident investigators”.
Ironically, the report then acknowledges that, “{l}ater he gave a more plausible
account to the Australian Federal Police and the Queensland Parks and Wildlife
Service, before appearing in court…”. Thus, rather than stating the truth to an
independent investigating body, with no vested powers to take a case to court, the
chief mate selected otherwise. However, one cannot generalise and this does not
disqualify the views of those who favour independent investigating bodies.
Understandably, the report has no interest in indicating the legal advice, if any,
received by the chief mate.

Furthermore, the situation may be viewed from a

different perspective - gaining public confidence indeed takes years of professional
work.
From a scientific point of view, Kirwan opines that it is unacceptable to use an
investigation to justify some actions taken at the sharp end, simply because the
system is so complex that the sharp end is the mere operator of that system99. In so
doing, however, he acknowledges that the nature of ‘modern’ accidents does promote
an attitude to apportion blame, yet, he cautions that blame has nothing to do with
Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) as in this regard, blame serves no purpose.
Wiswall believes that it makes no difference whether or not the investigator forms
part of an investigating infrastructure, which is independent from the regulating
body. He maintains that if the role of the investigator is to identify the contributing
causes to the casualty, then most often he “reveals” both fault and blame, no matter
how much he avoids mentioning these two terms in the casualty investigation
report100. Reason views this revelation of fault and blame from a different angle and
instead underscores the legitimate search for contributing factors101.
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F. L. Wiswall, supra note 18. Whilst that may be true, nevertheless, there is sufficient merit in
the submission that the investigator should be autonomous from the regulator, simply because the
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He expressed his point of view most succinctly This is not a question of allocating blame, but simply a recognition of the fact that
even in the best-run organisations a significant number of influential decisions will
subsequently prove to be mistaken. This is a fact of life. Fallible decisions are an
inevitable part of the design and management process.

Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation requires in Clause 5.4
that the accident investigating authority shall be independent from any judicial or
administrative proceedings102. Furthermore, Clause 5.12 lists down a set of records,
which shall be used only for the safety investigation. The list includes, inter alia,
witness’ statements and cockpit voice recordings. It is specifically cautioned that if
this information, which also embraces statements given voluntarily by a witness, is
used for purposes other than a safety investigation, then flight safety will be seriously
affected. It has already been emphasised that it stands to reason that a witness will
co-operate more if he is assured that the information given is not admissible in a
court of law. Should there be a possibility of self-incrimination, then the witness’
lawyer would suggest otherwise.
As it would be expected, the report on the Maritime Casualties Conference & Expo,
did not indicate any specific reference to NTSB in the debates raised during the
Conference - maybe in view of NTSB’s objectives and reputation built throughout
the years103. This is very interesting because although NTSB does not determine
blame or liability, however, any evidence gathered is also made available to the

fault or blame appearing in the investigators’ findings may be that of the regulator. This point is
expanded further in section 3.1.4 of this chapter.
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USCG and a witness might still stop short of stating what exactly happened
according to him during the course of the accident104.
The USCG tends to agree that problems may arise from adversarial settings, but
quite naturally, it finds the accusatory tone against its system very abstruse105.
During the Maritime Casualties Conference & Expo, it was remarked that rather than
pointing a finger towards the USCG, one should instead look at its history and
analyse how it conducts casualty investigations. These arguments were justified
based on case studies, which show that USCG investigations are impartial and fair,
only engaging in a criminal process when there is evidence of criminal intent. It was
also remarked that the USCG would never seek criminal actions against anyone
during the initial stages of the investigation106.
In this particular issue, it is being suggested that lawyers are not justified in declaring
that the USCG launches a casualty investigation when there already exists a bias that
there was criminal intent107. A thorough investigation (and the USCG investigations
have been widely acclaimed for their contribution to safety of life at sea and
environmental protection) definitely requires the investigators and anyone engaged in
the process neither to be biased, nor to make any assumptions in reaching their
conclusions.
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D. Rabe, the USCG Chief at the Investigations Division remarks his awareness that there are
countries, such as Canada, where witness’ interviews are conducted in private and not released to
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3.1.3

Investigators’ expertise

One opponent of independent investigating bodies points out that investigators
forming part of a maritime administration have extensive knowledge of ships, how
shipping companies operate108 and are aware of international regulations, which are
either in force or being drafted at IMO. It is also being maintained that this does not
apply to investigators forming part of independent investigating bodies. This is so
because they either lack the necessary knowledge, or else they tend to lose their
expertise because the infrastructure of their organisation is not flexible enough to
allow them to keep in touch with the realities of shipping, be it technological and
regulatory109.
In 1999, the USCG presented several justifications as to why it should retain the
primacy in maritime casualty investigation110. For instance, it was maintained that •

The USCG has substantial technical expertise at hand;

•

It had knowledge on the operations of commercial ships, which it has
managed to gain from the daily communications and its day-to-day
duties; and based on these interactions

•

The USCG investigators can focus immediately on latent failures and if
there is a need to address the legislative framework (or its inadequacy)
then, the exercise will be commenced immediately, even before the
investigation has been completed.

However, others rebut these comments and explain that all the countries, which have
established an independent investigating body ensure, in their own interest, that their
investigators form part of the delegations to various IMO meetings, including the FSI
108

Since several psychologists have expressed their reservations on this point, this issue will be
further discussed in sub-section 3.1.4.1 below.
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In this particular occasion, Admiral J. Loy, the former Commandant of the USCG, addressed a
Sub-Committee of the US Senate which was discussing legislative amendments, entitled
“National Transportation Safety Board Amendments of 1999”. These amendments included,
inter alia, provisions to provide NTSB with the necessary jurisdiction to have the right of
primacy in maritime casualty investigation. See J. Loy, (1999).
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Sub-Committee, where casualty statistics and analyses are discussed111. The same
applies in the US, where the Memorandum between the USCG and NTSB obliges
the former to invite NTSB at all IMO meetings where maritime casualty
investigation issues are expected to be discussed112.
3.1.4

Conflicts of interest

Another justification brought forward by independent investigating bodies is that the
IMO Code can only be effectively implemented if there are no conflicts of interest
within the investigating body113.

Lang recalls that following the Formal

Investigation into the Herald of Free Enterprise casualty (and therefore well before
the IMO Code was adopted), it became apparent that there existed potential conflicts
of interest if the (then) UK Marine Directorate114 established policies and
investigated maritime casualties.
It is further suggested that if safety is the aim of the investigation (which also
happens to be the objective of the IMO Code), then there are no other credible ways
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Discussion with S. Harwood May 28, 2003. Captain S. Harwood is MAIB’s Deputy Chief
Inspector.
In addition, this writer is of the opinion that it would be arguable if one had to express scepticism
to establish an independent investigating body, based on the theory that expertise may be lost
because of an inflexible infrastructure. One must not neglect the fact that an independent
casualty investigator is a specialised and dedicated player. As opposed to the
regulator/investigator, the former is separated from the additional bureaucracy, which the
regulator/investigator has to satisfy in the day-to-day operation of a maritime administration. An
independent casualty investigator is therefore much more in touch with the ‘casualty world’
rather than the ‘shipping world’ and per se, that guarantees the necessary expertise.
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but to function independently from the regulator115.

This is so because

notwithstanding its objectivity, an investigation carried out by a regulatory body will
be “tainted by conflicts of interest”.

This section attempts to explain how an

investigation carried out by the regulator may be “tainted by conflicts of interest”.
Deschênes referred to the comments given by the Canadian Bar Association, which
in 1977 had identified the following conflicts of interest116 •

Her Majesty as investigator and Her Majesty as potential litigant;

•

Her Majesty as investigator and Her Majesty as enforcer of regulations;
and

•

Her Majesty as investigator and Her Majesty as supplier of services.

Similarly, the issue of conflicts of interest led the Dutch Government to establish an
independent transport safety board in The Netherlands on July 01, 1999117. It is
believed that the objectives of the IMO Code can be best met if the investigating
body has no relation whatsoever, either direct or indirect, with the policymakers/governmental (inspection) agencies. In most cases, a thorough investigation
into the root causes of any casualty, would reveal that the underlying factors relate
to, inter alia, lack of inspections, inadequate implementation and enforcement of
rules and regulations or inadequate safe manning118.
This line of reasoning means that most of these underlying factors, if not all, stem
from decision-makers or individuals whose statures may be jeopardised by the
outcome of a thorough casualty investigation. This is the rationale behind these
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points and in view of the shortcomings of human nature, an investigation cannot be
carried out or even masterminded by these very same people119.
The same philosophy is acknowledged by observers in the aviation industry, who
consider that a conflict of interest may arise when “…there was a reasonable
possibility that an accident was caused or contributed to, by the action or inaction of
the Department of Transport’s officials in their role as providers of civil aviation
facilities…”120.
The above viewpoints support the standpoint of the Canadian Bar Association
mentioned earlier. Indeed, they highlighted that conflicts of interest are not problems
which

commence

and

terminate

at

the

middle

management

i.e.

the

investigator/regulator in a department of his maritime administration; they are also a
major concern for the higher management level, where policies and strategies are
drawn up.
To overcome this problem, countries with a Westminster type of Government and
which have established an independent investigating body, do not require the latter to
report to the Minister of Transport121. For instance, in order to remain autonomous
and avoid conflicts of interest, the Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSBCanada) reports directly to Parliament, through the President of the Queen’s Privy
Council for Canada122.
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In addition, the Canadian Transport Safety Board Act requires, inter alia, in
Subsections 6(1) that: a Member of the Board shall not retain any direct or indirect
interest in transportation (which incorporates all modes since TSB-Canada is a multimodal investigating board). It also requires in Subsections 6(2) and 6(3) the disposal
of any transportation interest and resignation from any other office that might
conflict with the Member’s duties in the Board123.
The conflicts of interest, which may arise when a regulator investigates a casualty,
also apply to all flag State administrations, which have the policy of delegating
authority to recognised organisations, on matters, which e.g. include regulations for
the construction of ships, designs of operational systems and noise and vibration124.
All these points sound one perfectly harmonised tone. The objective of a safety
investigation should be the prevention of accidents and it is recognised that whether
or not one is in consensus, the only way to achieve this, is through an independent
investigation, which is unbiased and based on facts and honest conclusions.
In coming to a decision on this issue, Deschênes affirmed that from the research
which he had carried out, it was very clear that the industry in general considered
that a potential for conflicts of interest would immediately emerge should the
investigating body form part of the regulatory structure125.

Expanding on his

findings, he recognised that a civil servant might be reluctant to publicly recommend
his colleague to improve his performance and declared “no government service
organization,

however

successful,

should

be

above

public

scrutiny

and

monitoring”126. What Deschênes implied is that it is unacceptable that the same civil
servant in a maritime administration acts as the judge and the jury.
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From the perspective of a flag State Administration, this remark by Deschênes
suggests also that the loyalty, which a regulator has towards safety onboard ships
registered under his own flag, should not give him immunity from public scrutiny.
The views expressed so far have one resounding point: the government should never
be in a position to enjoy monopoly in issues related to safety127.
Making a strong reservation, one maritime administration acknowledges that
superficially, the public perception might see benefits in the establishment of
independent investigating bodies128. However, it pointed out that an investigator
who is a member of a maritime administration, has his own integrity as well, and his
professional judgement can be relied upon. In addition, if there were a major conflict
or a major casualty, the investigation carried out e.g. by this particular maritime
administration would only be a preliminary one as it will be followed by a Formal
Investigation with public hearings before a judge129.
If such were the case, then a judicial investigation would overcome the problem
raised by the conflicts of interest. In spite of these views, this writer is of the opinion
that there are at least three important flaws to consider with this setting. These are •

The procedure is only followed in cases of major conflicts and major
casualties;

•

The definition of a ‘major conflict’; and

•

The judicial process per se.

127

See P. v. Vollenhoven, (2001). It may be disputed that conflicts of interest can be investigated by
Parliament, especially in countries where an independent investigating body has not been
established. Such an exercise may work satisfactory, but one also has to consider the priorities
afforded to the maritime sector versus other national issues on the Parliament’s agenda. Such a
process may therefore lead to a bureaucratic exercise, which may still not promote the benefits
that a safety investigation has the potential to offer.
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Whilst IMO has defined what a very serious casualty is130, there is no established
international criterion, which determines what is a major conflict of interest and what
benchmark has to be used. In addition, a judicial investigation will still result in an
adversarial setting, which is neither favoured by scholars nor is it in line with the
spirit of the IMO Code because it undermines its basic purpose of fact-finding.
However, the above procedures cannot be looked upon or viewed as a straw in a
hurricane of hypes. Referring to the USCG, Loy stated: “the concern over Coast
Guard impartiality is unfounded”. He viewed this problem as trivial because the
selected investigators would have never formed part of the command chain involved
in the particular case, apart from the fact that NTSB has the right of participation
during interviews131. This does not justify, however, this position worldwide. The
US has a unique set-up, with two bodies having concurrent jurisdiction to investigate
casualties, as regulated by a Memorandum of Understanding signed on September
12, 2002132. Furthermore, several IMO Member States carry out interviews behind
closed doors, and interested third parties do not have the right either to
participate/observe, or to have a copy of the interview transcript, without the consent
of the interviewee.
In addition to the judicial process (which has been discussed above), “…an internal
system of checks” can be seen as providing a possible solution to the risk of conflicts
of interest133. This suggestion runs in parallel with Loy’s view i.e. ensuring that a
maritime administrator does not investigate casualties onboard ships if his previous
130
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whether a particular major marine casualty “warrants an independent investigation by NTSB”,
even if the conditions surrounding the casualty in question do not satisfy the requirements of
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note 112 at pp. 2, 4.
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decisions may be questioned. Furthermore, one has to assume that the decisions
taken (in line with the maritime administration’s policies) would be recorded and
therefore, it would become readily apparent if the decisions are not raised in the
investigation and the final report.
Deschênes referred to his research and pointed out that several people in the
maritime industry do not consider conflicts of interest a crucial point134.

One

observer replied cynically to his question …there is the potential for conflict of interest in any free society and obviously the
risk will always be there. There are bound to be bad apples in every barrel but I am
prepared to accept the risk, if a witch hunt is the alternative.

In analysing these views, it results that the query is not whether or not one should
acknowledge the existence of conflicts of interest.

It seems that everyone is

accepting that there is either a risk or a perceived risk. The point is that at one end,
some are very explicit and declare that the minute the regulator starts investigating,
then that is already a conflict of interest. The remainder, at the other end, opt to have
an internal safety mechanism of some sort, which is triggered, should the risk of
conflicts of interest become a threat to the investigation or exceeds a pre-determined
threshold.
3.1.4.1 A psychologist’s observation on conflicts of interest
Examining this problem through a psychological microscope, Reason considers
conflicts of interest as a threat to safety and risk management.

He refers to

Vaughan’s view that “…the regulatory process - discovery, monitoring, investigation
and sanctioning - is inevitably constrained by the interorganizational relations
existing between the regulatory body and the regulated company. These, in turn,
lead to relationships based more upon bargaining and compromise than threats and
sanctions”. Reason also points out that one of the most serious problems which
regulators experience, originates from the nature of the business and complexities of
134
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the industry (be it maritime, aviation or otherwise). These complexities will prevent
them from obtaining a thorough idea on how the regulated entities are in reality
operating and conducting their business135. He expounded that In an effort to work around these obstacles, regulators tend to become dependent upon
the regulated organizations to help them acquire and interpret information. Such
interdependence can undermine the regulatory process in various ways.

The

regulator’s knowledge of the nature and severity of a safety problem can be
manipulated by what the regulated organization chooses to communicate and how this
material is presented. Regulators, being human beings, tend to establish personal
relationships with the regulated - they get to like the people they oversee and come to
sympathize with their problems on a personal level - and this sometimes compromises
their ability to identify, report or sanction violations.

The above enforcement problem can be extended to casualty investigations
conducted by the regulator. Reason’s thoughts may be easily applied to a maritime
administration on two different levels •

The relationship between the administration and its ‘clients’ - the
shipowners; and

•

Its relationship with the recognised organisations, which have been
delegated the authority to carry out surveys onboard its ships and in
certain instances issue Statutory Certificates on its behalf.

The latter point is crucial, especially if the regulator does not have the technical
resources to implement the conventions and therefore relies heavily on the expertise
of the recognised organisation and then, following a casualty, attempts to investigate
the operation of the same recognised organisation.
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3.1.5

The impact of safety recommendations

It has been argued that NTSB’s impartiality meant that over the years, the latter has
gained a reputation, which has helped its recommendations “gaining greater
authority”136. In other words, this meant that since NTSB is not a regulatory body
and has no conflicts of interest, its findings and recommendations are more credible
and readily acceptable.
This statement is, however, denied in quite a harsh and acute style and based on
personal experiences, some do not concede this view. Instead, it is maintained that
any sensible and responsible shipowner will take onboard sensible and practical
recommendations and the value of these recommendations is not necessarily
enhanced simply because they originate from an independent investigating body137.
Furthermore, others recall casualty investigation reports prepared by independent
investigating bodies, which reflected a “going-in agenda”, because it was evident that
the investigating body was already biased (confirmation bias) in its findings.
Similarly, there were reports prepared by non-independent investigating bodies,
which “were extremely revealing and self-critical”138.

3.2

Implications on the Implementation of the IMO Code

The two set-ups in the maritime industry, which claim that they are sufficiently
geared to implement the IMO Code have been identified.

Moreover, the most

important incentives to justify the respective set-ups have been analysed. If the
effects of the selected set-up were contained within a particular IMO Member State,
then the situation would be a national issue. However, because shipping is so
international in character and the rise of aspiring maritime States has had such an
136
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important impact, not least on ships and seaborne trade, then it is only expected that
ultimately, these two set-ups have to interact as a result of a casualty. It is here that
one has to analyse whether or not, these two different set-ups, which claim that their
infrastructure is well designed to vigilantly implement the IMO Code, are in fact
hindering the industry from fully benefiting from a safety investigation (with the
concepts of both hindsight and foresight in mind)139.
One member of the maritime industry is of the view that the issue of hindrance is
intrinsically related to whether or not an investigating body is independent from the
regulatory framework. After all, even before attempting to analyse, one has to define
the term ‘independent’. Rather, he concedes that the real issue is the scope of the
investigation, held by the other substantially interested State, be it a flag, port or
coastal State140.
Very recently, MAIIF published the results of an internal survey141. An analysis of
this survey and further clarifications sought by this writer revealed that the extent of
international co-operation concerning Australia, Canada, Netherlands, New Zealand
and UK142, depends on the following criteria •

The objective of the other State (safety investigation or punitive basis);

•

Thoroughness, independence and openness of reporting; and

•

Independent investigation with no links to criminal/civil investigation.
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The findings of the MAIIF survey therefore explain the view expressed above.
Based on these countries’ common philosophy concerning casualty investigation, it
is only expected that international co-operation (for instance sharing of witness’
interviews) is approached with maximum care. The national legislation of some of
these countries requires the investigating body to compel the witness to provide
information. Thus, a witness is not given the right to remain silent but in return, it is
ensured that the information given is protected and not used for third purposes143.
It therefore does seem that there is no direct link between international co-operation
and the framework of the investigating body144. However, there is one issue, which
in reality provides an indirect link: the requirements pertaining to incompetency, acts
or omissions, as prescribed in the STCW Convention, as amended.
3.2.1

The STCW Convention and its relevance to casualty investigation

STCW Regulation I/5 obliges contracting Parties to establish and enforce within their
national legal framework, processes and procedures to investigate, inter alia, any
alleged incompetency, acts or omission by seafarers, holding certificate of
competencies issued by their administration or else endorsed to attest the issuing of
that certificate.

Morrison points out that these legal procedures may declare a

seafarer “unfit” to serve onboard a ship, and in line with this, the issuing Party is
obliged to determine whether or not the certificate or the endorsement (attesting
issuance) should be withdrawn, suspended or even cancelled145. It remains with the
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contracting Party and its national legislation to determine how to operate the regime.
However, this procedure could also be initiated during a casualty investigation.
It would therefore be relevant to consider a fictitious investigation in a State ‘A’
where an independent investigating body does not exist. One may also assume that
the investigator in State ‘A’ has launched a safety investigation, with the purpose of
identifying active and latent failures, as required by the IMO Code. The problem
immediately crops up when during the course of the investigation, the investigator
has strong evidence suggesting that, for instance, the master onboard the ship
registered in State ‘A’ was incompetent or could have carried out a more diligent
manoeuvre.
Based on this scenario and on the fact that his country is a contracting Party to the
STCW Convention, the investigator has no solution to this dilemma but to report his
analysis to his Director - because STCW Regulation I/5 requires a legal process to
investigate the master’s manoeuvre and actions. Thus, the investigator has found
himself in a position where he has to remove the hat of a safety investigator and wear
that of a regulator in order to enforce the STCW Convention.
It is important to note that the above applies even if it were not flag State ‘A’ that
issued the master’s certificate of competency (or endorsed the attestation of its
issuance) as required by STCW Regulation I/2. Although this flag State would not
be able to withdraw, suspend or cancel the master’s certificate of competency or the
endorsement attesting its issuance, however, in accordance with the same regulation,
State ‘A’ may still withdraw, suspend or cancel the endorsement, which attests the
recognition of the certificate of competency. If this action were taken, then the
master would not be able to sail on ships flying the flag of State ‘A’, an action that
falls within the parameters of apportioning blame146.
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Without initiating court proceedings, a flag State may withdraw, suspend or cancel the
endorsement, which attests the recognition of a certificate of competency. This is so because the
recognition withdrawal is simply an administrative action where only the ‘recognition regime’ is
operative. View expressed by P. K. Mukherjee in a personal interview August 27, 2003.
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Expanding further on this presumption, the scenario may now involve another
substantially interested State; say, the casualty happened in the waters of a State,
which has an independent investigating body e.g. New Zealand. Considering the fact
that the casualty occurred in its territorial waters, New Zealand will lead the
investigation, as described in IMO Code, Section 7. Based on its fundamental policy
of not determining blame and protecting evidence for the sake of safety, New
Zealand will not be in a position to unconditionally extend its co-operation to State
‘A’, simply because the latter is obliged to start legal proceedings, as soon as
evidence indicates possibilities of incompetency147.
On the same grounds, ATSB will provide investigation documents to another
substantially interested State, if and only if, that substantially interested State
undertook that the documents were necessary for a safety investigation148. Based on
the requirements of STCW Regulation I/5, a regulator/investigator may be reluctant
to give such guarantee as at that stage of the investigation, he would be in no position
to recognise where the evidence would lead him, unless of course he is already
biased.

147

In this case, there is an interaction between State A and another State, which is leading the
casualty investigation. Therefore, the national maritime legislation of the former must prescribe
what is the value of the factual findings of the State leading the investigation vis-à-vis the judicial
process in the country. View expressed by P. K. Mukherjee in a personal interview August 04,
2003.

148

K. Filor, supra note 140.

49

3.3

The Emerging Trends in Europe

Those supporting the establishment of an independent investigating body maintain
that if this set-up has proved beneficial in the aviation industry, then there is no
reason why the same philosophy should not produce the same welcoming results in
the maritime industry. One proponent of independent investigating bodies believes
that such a system is “…every citizen’s right and society’s duty”149. The structures
of independent investigating bodies differ; the extent of independence varying, even
if one compares e.g. Canada and Denmark150 (or with what one may describe as a
hybrid system in the US) - but the objective remains the same.
The Thematic Network for Safety Assessment of Waterborne Transport (THEMES)
report refers to the British Airways Safety Information System (BASIS) programme,
which recommended, inter alia, “{t}he separation of the agency/department
collecting and analysing the reports from those bodies with authority to institute
disciplinary proceedings and impose sanctions”151.
Vollenhoven, recalled that on March 06, 2002 in a response to his letter, the EU
Commission Vice-President152 wrote that …with respect to the need for independent investigation into the causes of accidents
and incidents, I can only confirm that the Commission shares your views. This is
clearly expressed in the "White Paper/European Transport Policy for 2010: Time to
Decide", of 12 September 2001…

One still has to see whether or not this would become a reality and if so, to what
extent. What is definite is that the problems related to independent investigating
bodies need deep consideration, both legally and financially. However, the issue of
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independent investigating bodies is not a novel concept to the EU, at least not in
another mode of transport.
On November 21, 1994, the EU Council adopted Council Directive 94/56/EC on
casualty investigations in civil aviation153.

In line with the Chicago 1944

Convention, the Directive requires in Article 6.1 that the body responsible for the
investigation is “functionally independent” of regulatory and other bodies, which
might have an interest, in conflict with the investigation.
So far, in the maritime sector, an independent investigation is still limited to a
national approach rather than a globally accepted practice.

For most European

States, it is still in its infancy. Once determined, one has to see how the EU will put
forward its ‘independent’ notion on a global domain, i.e. at IMO. Past casualties
have confirmed that in other delicate issues, the EU recognised very well when, how,
and where to exert pressure in order to foster its policies and objectives.
3.3.1

The economic viability of independent investigating bodies

It is much debated, especially by most aspiring maritime States that an independent
investigating body is extremely expensive and the financial burden is large enough to
be classified as unsustainable154. As one scholar opines, whilst the trend is in favour
of independent investigating bodies, “…this is simply impractical and uneconomic
for most maritime States”155.
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Of course, a politician will definitely look at the expenses which the taxpayer will
have to bear in order to run an independent investigating body. Naturally, in trying
to justify an independent investigating body, a government will analyse the maritime
activity and whether or not it is vital for the national economic motor. However,
even then, considering the expenses of an independent investigating body may not be
the best way to reach a decision on whether or not the body should be established.
The exercise may be very subjective even in its initial process of establishing a
benchmark to measure the level of success and deciding on the appropriateness of the
investment.

It is difficult to measure the level of success and determine how

expensive is expensive.
An argument derived from monetary considerations is per se a sharp double-edged
sword. It is very difficult to quantify the costs or benefits of accident investigations,
immaterial of whether they are carried out by an independent investigating body or
the regulator. It is therefore inappropriate for both set-ups to justify their respective
position based on costs incurred or saved.
Financial concerns do take, however, precedence over other issues. As Robin puts it:
“Economic constraints facing aspiring maritime States dictate that health, education,
physical infrastructure and other pressing needs must take priority over maritime
affairs”156. This comment explains why so far, independent investigating bodies
have only been established in developed western countries.
3.3.2

The Danish Maritime Authority (DMA) Order of 2003

From the foregoing, it is clear that the two identified set-ups constitute two extremes.
Both set-ups declare that their respective philosophy is more than justified in
implementing the IMO Code. Experience has in fact shown that when there was a
genuine will to honour safety, both the regulator (wearing the hat of an investigator)
and the independent investigating body have contributed immensely towards
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achieving safer ships and cleaner oceans. Denmark, an EU Member State, has aimed
to find a balance of both approaches by establishing a policy somewhere in between.
On February 01, 2003, DMA Order No. 31 of January 14, 2003, came into force,
bringing changes to the Danish maritime investigations.

The responsibility of

casualty investigations, however, rests with the DMA. Aware of the problem (or the
perceived problem) of conflicts of interest, Section 1(3) requires investigations to be
carried out separately from any other function or activity of the DMA. Section 2 of
the Order also prescribes that the aim of an investigation shall reflect the aim and
principle of the IMO Code and does not therefore determine liability or apportion
blame157; the term ‘shall’ being imperative when used in a strict legal sense.
Nonetheless the above, the Order has some shortcomings in addressing in real depth
the two major problems mentioned in this chapter i.e. the perspective of lawyers and
the industry and the conflicts of interest. It has to be acknowledged that a separate,
almost isolated Division has been created. However, it remains part of the DMA
structure. Section 3.1.4 of this chapter attempted to explain that conflicts of interest
are not solely limited to the middle management but are also a matter of concern for
higher levels. Thus, critics in favour of independent investigating bodies would
insist that the Division is not autonomous at all, since it still reports to the DMA
Director General (and the same Minister).
The Order does provide, however, a tool for managing conflicts of interest. Section
11(4) gives the Division the prerogative to decide the appropriateness of publishing a
casualty investigation report or even drawing one up in the first place. Therefore, if
there is a conflict of interest, the Division may opt to refrain from carrying out a
casualty investigation and leave the matter to another competent body, such as a
public inquiry158. This option will again raise the issue of costs. Taking into
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consideration the quantity, time frames and the expertise required, public inquiries
tend to be very costly indeed.
Furthermore, the industry may still view the Division’s objective as determination of
blame, especially because it lies within the regulator and his compliance culture.
Whilst the Order specifies that the aim of the investigations is not to determine blame
or liability, however, it does not prevent the report or investigation documents from
being used in a court of law159. In addition, Section 6(3) requires the DMA Division
to make the witness aware that he/she has the right to remain silent if it is assessed
that the witness in question may face criminal proceedings. That further emphasises
that the report and/or the investigation documents may be used in a Court of Law.
Whilst remaining silent does not serve the objective of safety investigations, the factfinding process is ultimately not separate from the determination of guilt since the
safety investigation may transform itself into an adversarial setting. The findings of
a public inquiry are also admissible in a Danish Court of Law, meaning that whilst
conflicts of interest may have been mitigated to a certain extent, there remains the
problem of guilt versus a safety investigation.
3.3.3

The

Casualty

Analysis

Methodology

for

Maritime

Operations

(CASMET) WP2 report (1998)
The issue is that in order to gain the maximum benefit that is possible from a
casualty investigation, the key persons involved have to be given some degree of
immunity, even if they may have committed an offence. However, in so doing,
safety may be equally compromised, as if no investigation had been carried out in the
first place160.
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The CASMET WP2 report explains this dilemma very lucidly: “{b}oth functions are
necessary in order to maintain safety, but it seems that each function is blocking the
other function”. To justify the separation of these two functions, the report refers to
the aviation industry (i.e. Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil
Aviation)161 and to the establishment of the non-regulatory Chemical Safety and
Hazard Investigation Board in the US in 1994 - both of which are signs that
independence “is a necessity for true accident investigation”162.
The report therefore presents two options to States like Denmark and other countries,
where the regulator has a dual role. These are i)

Rule enforcement versus responsibility demonstrated; and

ii)

Rule enforcement versus new lessons.

In adopting option (i), the CASMET WP2 report requires a balance between the
strict act of sanction (because of the committed offence) and the responsibility
demonstrated by the offenders. The criteria for quantifying responsibility will be
based on the extent of voluntary reporting, co-operation with the authorities and the
action taken to prevent the casualty. Since such responsibilities are documented in
the Safety Management System (SMS), the report suggests the latter to be taken as a
benchmark.
On the other hand, option (ii) is based on the fact that some hazards are well known to the extent that authorities have sought to mitigate them by erecting safety barriers.
If that would be the case, then the investigation would follow a legal track and
sanctions may be initiated against those held responsible. Otherwise, if this were a
newly identified hazard, those involved would receive immunity.

This option
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necessitates a preliminary investigation to determine if the case is ‘legal’ or ‘factfinding’163.
Nevertheless, the CASMET WP2 report identifies limitations in these two options,
suggesting that there is nothing akin to independent investigating bodies. In citing
Bird and Germain, the report cautions that casualty investigation involves interacting
with people who may be, inter alia, concerned about punishment, their reputation
and the attitudes of the industry towards them164.
The first option may also be difficult to adopt. Unless specified otherwise, the
SOLAS 1974 Convention, Regulation I/1, prescribes that the Convention does not
apply to ships, which are not engaged on international voyages as defined in
Regulation I/2 of the Convention. Furthermore, SOLAS 1974, Regulation IX/2 does
not apply to, inter alia, oil and chemical tankers, gas carriers, bulk carriers, cargo
high-speed crafts, other cargo ships and mobile offshore drilling units below 500
gross tonnage165. Moreover, if the SMS is used as a benchmark for this purpose, the
investigator may run into the danger of excessively concentrating on the sharp end
and in so doing, neglecting higher levels of the complex system.
The second option provides a formidable challenge to overcome conflicts of interest
at the higher management level. Even if the authorities (high level management) had
created safety barriers, unless Mens Rea166 offences were committed, the occurrence
of the casualty simply means that the barriers had either failed, or were inadequate.
A thorough investigation will have to be carried out to determine which barriers
failed, how and why. This may prove too sensitive for the investigator/regulator to
criticise his superiors. Even if all these obstacles are overcome and the case takes a
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legal track, there remains the problem of whether or not there is room for a safety
investigation. Provided that the latter has not been jeopardised, the question of who
will carry out the safety investigation, (now that the investigating authorities have
opted to wear the prosecutor’s hat) needs to be answered.

3.4

Casualty Investigation and Co-operation

This chapter analyses the different set-ups, which are in place for the purpose of
casualty investigation. It also examines the perception of the industry and scholars
on determination of blame. Figure 3.4a illustrates that data and events are a vital
input to the analysis and a witness remaining silent will adversely affect this process.
This rationalises the concern of those who oppose adversarial settings.

Disaster

Method

Data & events report

Focus of
investigation

Investigating
body

Focus of
investigation

Investigating
body

Terms of
Reference

Analysis

Conclusions
Hindsight

Figure 3.4a
Source:

Casualty Investigation and Co-operation.
Adapted from J.-U. Schröder (2003) at p. 4 and B. Toft & S. Reynolds, 1997 at p. 56.

Another major problem - conflicts of interest, is also examined. In studying the
various views, it appears that all concerned agree that potential conflicts of interest
do exist - the dissenting views pertain to how the problem shall be addressed. As the
figure demonstrates, should this situation arise (irrespective of the severity, which
one would like to attribute to the problem of conflicts of interest), then the entire
system will be jeopardised because it will result in an internal problem within the
investigating body. In fact, either through an independent investigating body or
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through a series of internal ‘safety mechanisms’, each set-up acknowledges that it
has to address the setback167.
It has transpired that an attempt to adopt a policy lying somewhere in between will
not entirely solve either problem. Even an internal monitoring system might not be
as effective as it sounds, considering that in being internal, it is not impartial and
therefore the regulator is still beyond public scrutiny.
The figure also explains that each investigating body has its own focus, which
reflects the intents and purposes of each substantially interested State. Should two
investigating bodies168 have the same objectives of safety, then in accordance with
IMO Code, Section 7.1, the lead investigating State can ‘develop a common strategy’
(terms of reference) with the substantially interested State/s.

Based on a pre-

determined method, the analysis of the data and events can then be carried out.
If, however, the foci of the investigation are not synchronised and the investigating
bodies have different objectives (for instance due to STCW Convention, Regulation
I/5), then the figure implies that a problem at the analysis stage will materialise. In
fact, the chapter also refers to various IMO Member States who are very cautious
when it comes to sharing of evidence. In this case, there remains no other plausible
options but for each substantially interested State to carry out its own investigation a situation which does not foster international co-operation or reflect the spirit of the
IMO Code.
Due to the potential of conflicts of interest and the awkward situation, which an
investigator/regulator might encounter in view of the requirements of the STCW
Convention, the spirit of the IMO Code may be frustrated unless the investigator is
167

Although the chapter focuses mostly on conflicts of interest on a regulator/investigator basis,
however, it does not mean that an investigator within an independent body is immune from the
problem of conflicts of interest, for instance on a personal basis. This issue is referred to in
section 3.1.4 of this chapter.

168

For the sake of simplicity, figure 3.4a only shows two investigating bodies. In reality, this may
not be the case and additional substantially interested States may be involved in the investigation.
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forming part of a framework, which is entirely independent from the regulator.
Within the same context, it is acknowledged that the definition of a substantially
interested State in Section 4.11 of the IMO Code is very broad, to the extent that it
almost guarantees an absolute and unrestricted participation in the investigation.
Even so, there can still be mismatches between the substantially interested States
because of their divergent foci.
Interfering with the acquisition of information may either result from fear of
incrimination or is deliberate due to conflicts of interest. Casualty investigations
cannot afford hindrances in the gathering of information; otherwise, root cause
analysis will be incomplete and futile. Conversely, safety is equally not effectuated
if conventions are not enforced. Besides, a sanction is essential as a deterrent
measure or for preventing such conduct from being repeated.
It is therefore submitted that a complete segregation between the determination of
guilt and safety investigations is essential.
A partially autonomous body does not alleviate these difficulties because
investigation documents can still be used in court proceedings.

A partially

autonomous body is a misnomer, even paradoxical in character. Its creation is an
acknowledgement that both elements need to be separated, yet, they are re-linked at
some other point in the organisational structure. As such, that does not eliminate the
problem of conflicts of interest at the higher managerial level.
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CHAPTER 4 CASUALTY INVESTIGATION REPORTS
When the IMO Code was being drafted, it was expected that it would address the
issue of report writing in order to maintain consistency with the requirements of
international maritime conventions169. Section 1.4 of the IMO Code lays down the
purpose, which is “to create a marine casualty investigation process the aim of which
is to...publicise the causes of the casualty and to make safety recommendations”170.
This is pivotal for the investigation and means that a casualty investigation report
must serve as a vehicle for the conveying of safety recommendations to the interested
parties, including IMO. It is therefore suggested that unless casualty investigation
reports received at IMO are adequately detailed and well presented to serve their
intended purpose, then international co-operation cannot be expected to be
forthcoming. It has to be borne in mind that international co-operation is not limited
to the securing and preservation of human, physical and documentary evidence.
Discussions on safety recommendations at IMO are in fact based on international cooperation.
This chapter addresses the shortcomings of the system, focusing on the casualty
investigation report, how the findings of the investigation can be presented, and how
omissions of information and data can be minimised.

169

170

Appendix 1 to this dissertation identifies international convention law, which requires reports into
casualties to be forwarded to the Organization.
IMO, supra note 14.
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4.1

The Role of Casualty Investigation Reports

On February 2002, the FSI Sub-Committee forwarded document FSI 10/9/1 to all
IMO Member States. The FSI document suggested that “transparent, documented
and publicly available” casualty investigation reports should be the basis of any
legislative action towards achieving maritime safety and environmental protection171.
The document infers that in analysing the findings presented in a casualty
investigation report, international co-operation is an important need for the
coastal/port States, entities and individuals who have suffered from the effects of a
casualty172.
4.1.1

Learning from others

Similar views were expressed by Parker in 1998 in reference to the Estonia casualty.
He expressed concern that the owners of the vessel were oblivious to previous
accidents which involved structural damage to the bow visor during heavy
weather173. He also stated that a seafarer is only exposed to the environment onboard
his own ship, which makes it even more difficult for him to assess and appreciate the
dangers of life at sea174.
What Parker has raised is very relevant and has two components •

The importance to disseminate findings of casualty investigations; and

•

The quality of casualty investigation reports.

171

It has already been discussed in chapter 2 of this dissertation that this is not always the case,
especially when environmental protection is the main issue.
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IMO, supra note 69 at p. 1.
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In accordance with MSC/Circ.953 / MEPC/Circ.372, if the loss of a bow visor is not followed by
the total loss of the ship, loss of life or severe pollution, then the casualty is classified as ‘serious’
and a full investigation report is only required if there are important lessons to be learnt. See
MSC/Circ.953 / MEPC/Circ.372, Reports on Marine Casualties and Incidents. Revised
harmonized reporting procedures – Reports required under SOLAS regulation I/21 and
MARPOL 73/78 articles 8 and 12, (IMO, 2000c).
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C. J. Parker, Accident Investigation, (1998) at p.14. C. J. Parker is the Secretary of the Nautical
Institute.
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Schröder goes some steps further. He discusses the importance of investigating
casualties and complimenting the investigation with a thorough report175.

He

remarks that shipping is a complex system (like aviation), which involves an intimate
interaction of its elements with the human being. This creates a high-risk situation
for the operator of the system, his tool - the ship, and the environment in which he
operates. He also identifies several contributing factors, which make this system and
the human interaction even more complex. These are •

Seaborne trade remains on the incline;

•

Increase in ship size due to economies of scale; and

•

Increase in automation, which has led to minimising manning scales.

Schröder’s opinion supports what Bainbridge has identified as “The Ironies of
Automation”176. According to Bainbridge •

Automation has evolved to overcome human limitations although
limitations of automated systems are left to human beings;

•

Since automated systems require the operator to monitor rather than
operate, such functions increase the possibility of errors even by the most
motivated operators; and

•

Automation denies the operator the opportunity to practice the skill,
which may therefore create problems during emergencies.

It is claimed that although humans interact with the elements of a complex system,
this does not mean that accidents are more likely to happen. In fact, it is usually the
contrary; human beings will respond to situations that would have otherwise caused
the system to malfunction. However, when accidents happen in complex systems,
e.g. a maritime scenario, it is even more important to investigate and prepare a good
quality report to promulgate the findings. It must be borne in mind, that in all
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J.-U. Schröder, supra note 52 at p. 1.
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L. Bainbridge, The Ironies of Automation, (1987) at p. 272.
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probability, the ironies and complexity of the system would have been the main
contributing factors to the casualty177.
The importance of casualty investigation reports is also related to risk management
and the fact that casualties occur everywhere around the world178. If the findings of
these accidents are not promulgated by means of casualty investigation reports, then
any particular shipping company might not appreciate the severity of the accident,
hence delaying or preventing corrective actions altogether; believing that it was only
a one-off situation, which never happened (and will never happen) to anyone else179.
It is therefore evident that both scholars and members of the maritime industry share
a common view that there is a very good possibility that the promulgation of
information through casualty investigation reports will reduce the occurrence of
accidents. Initially, it might appear that there is not one accident similar to another
and that may very well be the case. However, even with the limitations of past
investigations, it has been shown that whilst one outcome differs from another,
underlying factors might share a trend.

4.2

A New Approach towards Casualty Investigation and Reports

Figure 4.2a illustrates how the perspective of the industry towards casualty
investigation and report writing has changed in the past 15 years.
The figure evokes the theory that in the maritime industry, in the past, the process
ended as soon as the casualty investigation report was finalised. The figure purports
to suggest that there is no other option for improving standards except post hoc a
casualty. This is almost true because an investigation is a reaction to a casualty, but
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Reason identifies these contributing factors as latent failures; weaknesses in the defences of a
complex system. See J. Reason, supra note 55 at p. 202.
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B. Toft & S. Reynolds, supra note 56 at p.4.
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B. Toft & S. Reynolds, ibid.
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during the years, another component has emerged: the proactive approach or
foresight.

Figure 4.2a
Source:

4.2.1

Accident Investigation Process.
N. Wayne, Marine Accident Investigation: time for change?, (1988).

The concept of foresight: its roles and limitations

Secretary-General O’Neil refers to foresight in the following terms180 It is irresponsible to wait for an accident to happen with an ensuing loss of life or
degradation of the environment before taking some corrective action.

IMO has

recognised this and in recent years has brought about a switch to the so-called
proactive approach with which it has reached some success. By introducing a more
structured risk analysis process through Formal Safety Assessment Procedures,
regulators are compelled to examine potential problem areas and to introduce
appropriate measures or standards before a tragedy occurs181.
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See W. O’Neil, (1999).
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See MSC/Circ.1023 / MEPC/Circ.392, Guidelines for Formal Safety Assessment for Use in the
IMO Rule-Making Process, (IMO, 2002b). MSC/Circ.1023 / MEPC/Circ.392 was approved by
MSC 74 and MEPC 47.
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Hence, the new approach towards casualties is the anticipation of an accident and in
so doing, the barriers within the complex system are strengthened i.e. an effective
attempt towards minimising the latent failures mentioned in section 4.1.1182.
Scholars do consider foresight as a tool to minimise latent failures. Reason reiterated
that in view of the unique trajectory of events that would have led to an accident, one
has to engage in this painful detail in order to minimise the possibility of accidents
from happening in the future. In this respect, he cautions that it would be futile to
address only the particular active failures. Since the trajectory of events is specific to
any one accident, even exclusive in their combination, then it would be wiser and
more effective to analyse the latent failures inherent in the system183.
Human error can only be studied by observing human behaviour and it may be done
using two methods; experimental and quasi-experimental. What the experimental
method entails is a simulator, which for instance represents a ship’s bridge or an
engine room.

The quasi-experimental method involves studies of casualty

investigation reports, interviews and observation of the crew during the course of
their duties184.
In the same context, Hollnagel wrote that when designing a new system, there are
two main points, which need to be addressed185. These are •

Foreseeing and evaluating possible initiating events (active failures); and

•

Analysing the possibility that the system recovers from the deviation.

The evaluation and analysis must include the study of the material/equipment failure,
envisage the behaviour of the operator and the conditions, which may influence this
behaviour186.
182

The importance of casualty investigation reports and their relation to foresight are addressed in
the following sections of this chapter.
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J. Reason, supra note 55 at p. 174.
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T. Koester, Human Error in the Maritime Work Domain, (2002) at p. 3.
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E. Hollnagel, supra note 59 at p. 84.
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The concept of foresight carries favourable characteristics. For instance, during
simulation exercises, the conditions that influence the human behaviour can be
manipulated through one’s choice. Furthermore, there is the possibility of observing
human behaviour, gathering and storing all the data and information, which can then
be referred to and studied at a later stage.
Whilst foresight and proactive actions are therefore synonymous, there are several
limitations to foresight. For instance, an exercise only simulates real scenarios.
Human behaviour may be influenced by this lack of reality and a true reflection of an
individual’s behaviour, e.g. under stress, will not be achieved because simulation
carries no real threat to life187. In addition, it is simply impossible for the designer of
the simulator to predict or anticipate all the variables and conditions, which influence
the operator of the complex system in reaching his decision188.
4.2.2

The importance of casualty investigation reports within the context of
foresight

It is established that the maritime industry is looking at a new proactive approach,
attempting to foresee failures and their consequences, and striving to design stronger
barriers to keep the hazard and the receiver as distant as possible.

It is also

understood that foresight, as a stand-alone concept, is not error-free and it does
contain limitations. This is in fact where the importance of casualty investigation
reports comes in.

Casualty investigations and the reports that follow can help

overcome some of these limitations by being an integral part of the foresight process.
Various academics and observers have voiced this important and interesting view.
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Having said so, one can easily conclude that Hollnagel’s theory is also perfectly valid if the
system is already in existence and it is either being extended or altered in some way or another.
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G. Nagy, Human Reliability Analysis: From Action to Context, (2002) at p. 3.
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B. Toft & S. Reynolds, supra note 56 at p. 68.
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In trying to make his readers visualise the importance of this concept, Reason refers
to American social scientist Weick who is quoted to have said189 We know that single causes are rare, but we don’t know how small events can become
chained together so that they result in a disastrous outcome. In the absence of this
understanding, people must wait until some crises actually occurs before they can
diagnose a problem, rather than be in a position to detect a potential problem before it
emerges. To anticipate and forestall disasters is to understand regularities in the ways
small events can combine to have disproportionately large effects.

There is no need to overstress that to understand and foresee what Weick, in his
words, calls latent failures and how they can agglomerate, is through the study of
detailed and thorough casualty investigation reports, including the reported findings.
It is asserted that if a well thought and organised casualty database is created, and all
the findings are refined and classified in accordance with a pre-determined
classification scheme or taxonomy, then the analysis and the data will be more
reliable and therefore will serve the purpose of foresight perfectly190. What is being
emphasised is that the casualty investigation report, which is the reaction of the
industry to a casualty, serves as a basic tool for the proactive approach.
Schröder maintains and states “…a solid combination of an assessment of
documented accidents and the expert forecast about the future performance will
certainly improve the results of a risk assessment of any new system”191. What he
depicts is approved by other members of the industry. The MCA was the pioneer of
the FSA as adopted by IMO192. Despite its new perspective, MCA still deems that
casualty investigation and reports have a major role to play in the proactive
189

J. Reason, supra note 49, p. 22.
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J.-U. Schröder & G. Zade, The Impact of Marine Casualty Investigation on Maritime
Administration and Maritime Education Training, (2002) at p. 289.
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J.-U. Schröder, supra note 52 at pp. 2-3.
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FSA came about following Lord Carver’s report in 1992, based on a principle that “the
regulator’s role is to reflect society’s expectations of an industry, in terms of an acceptable level
of safety at an acceptable cost. See J. H. Peachey, A New Safety Culture – for the Regulator Too,
(1999) at pp. 9-17.
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approach. MCA recognises that since the reports portray the real scenario, they
guide the analysts to determine a limit to the human behaviour study193.
Again, as Reason affirms, thorough reports also identify the latent failures in the
system, which may serve as an input to the foresight exercise or programmed into a
simulator to study the behaviour of the operator in these conditions. Thus, by taking
into consideration latent failures (both at the line management and higher
organisational levels) during the simulation process, one would expect a realistic
scenario, enabling the assessment of behavioural reactions194.
There are at least two advantages of systematically combining casualty investigation
reports and foresight195 •

Casualty reports are the best sources to reveal the link between human
error and the casualty; and

•

In comparison to experimental methods, quasi-experimental methods,
provide the material, data and evidence following a casualty, which is
already collected, compiled and analysed in the report.
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See E. Hughes & P. White, Formal Safety Assessment – Targeting Needs, (2002) at p. 26. This is
a very legitimate point. By examining Hollnagel’s Simple Model of Cognition (SMoC), it will be
affirmed that of all the elements that constitute a complex system, the human being, i.e. the
liveware, is the most flexible of all these elements. Not only does he have the capabilities to
operate the system but also observe, even anticipate a situation, analyse and react to it and then
observe again the outcome of his own reaction. Such properties and capabilities are surely a
challenge to the designer of the simulator’s software and for those trying to predict the future
performance of the entire system. See E. Hollnagel, supra note 59 at p. 100.
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J.-U. Schröder & J. Hahne, Maritime Casualty Analysis – An Adequate Basis for Simulation
during Maritime Education and Training?, (2003) at p. 2.
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T. Koester, supra note 184 at p. 1.
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4.3

The Current Situation in the Industry - Identified Weaknesses in
Casualty Investigation Reports

The above sections project the impression that after so many casualties,
investigations and supposed improvements in the analysis of these mishaps, mankind
has finally discovered the way to address these unwanted (but not unanticipated)
events and their consequences, which sometimes reach a disastrous scale. That not
being the case, it is only expected that questions are raised and a straightforward
reply is indispensable. This is so because, given that all this is known, the maritime
industry still suffers major recurrences of casualties, which seem to originate from
similar underlying factors.
Most importantly, international co-operation seems to reach a deadlock at this stage
after so much effort is expanded to reach an agreement in building its own
framework or blueprint.
4.3.1

The usability of casualty investigation reports

Some scholars are of the view that the information or data, which one can extract
from a casualty investigation report is somewhat limited, especially when it comes to
developing the ‘causes tree’.
Hollnagel refers to Swain, who, as early as 1990, had already declared that the data
available for first-generation Human Reliability Analysis (HRA)196 was “less-thanadequate” if an analyst had to predict human performance in complex systems197.
Thus, the problem of inadequate information manifests itself when based on the
findings of reports, one attempts to apply or implement corrective actions, which
would have even been recommended in the available reports198.

196

First-generation HRA is the classical approach, as compared to the second-generation HRA,
which is the modern approach.
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See E. Hollnagel, supra note 59 at pp. 8-9.
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R. Marí, Harmonization of Safety Criteria: Approach Proposal for New Accident Reports, (1997)
at p. 473.
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The overview of IMO’s Work Programme and Budget for the Twenty-Second
Financial Period, reported that the Secretary-General “considers that the average
quality and timeliness of accident reports submitted to the Organization is less than
satisfactory”199.
The emphasis made in previous sections on the building of a database, carries
considerable weight. To start with, there is no adequate database running which
could help in the analysis of human error200. This shortcoming had already been
brought to the attention of the Directorate General VII – Transport, Commission of
the European Communities, when the CASMET report was published. The report
highlighted that based on casualty investigation reports201•

The findings are classified by different taxonomies;

•

Recording of information is not uniform since each country makes use of
its own national system; and

•

The presentation of findings to IMO is inadequate.

A study on 42 casualty investigation reports, completed by Schröder in 2002,
revealed the same deficiencies. In fact, the findings did not satisfy his objectives of
reconstructing the accident process or trajectory of events, suggesting that these
reports are not adequate for the study of foresight202.
199

IMO, supra note 6. The first part of this statement is in contradiction with what the Working
Group on Casualty Analysis reported to the FSI Sub-Committee during its tenth session, where it
was stated that in comparison with previous years, the 69 casualty reports analysed were of good
quality, showing thorough investigation and presenting well described events and their
consequence. See IMO, Sub-Committee on Flag State Implementation (FSI), 10th session: 8-12
April 2002, (IMO, 2002d).
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J.-U. Schröder, supra note 52 at p. 1.
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P. Caridis, Casualty Analysis Methodology for Maritime Operations (CASMET), (1999b) at p. 17.
The CASMET report was published on June 30, 1999.
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J.-U. Schröder & G. Zade, supra note 190 at p. 290. The reports selected by Schröder range from
1979 to 1999 and this might therefore be a ‘partial’ explanation for not achieving his objectives.
As it has been stated in the initial pages of this chapter, it is only very recently that IMO Member
States realised the potential of casualty investigation reports as an input to foresight. Before that,
most reports only served as documentary evidence that the flag State had satisfied its obligations
prescribed in international maritime conventions. Further to the problem identified in this
section, at least one scholar questions the adequacy of Reason’s Hybrid model, which has been
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4.3.2

The intricacy to link evidence, analysis and conclusions

Casualty reports have become more intricate because of two main reasons. These
are203 •

Technological advances have created more complex systems; and

•

The emerging trend in the industry to address both latent and active
failures.

As one would expect, the concept of a ship being an integral part of a complex
system, has been renovated throughout the years.

Nowadays, automation is a

standard feature in any department onboard, despite the ironies referred to above.
The constant increase in maritime legislation adds to the complexity of the system.
In addition, manning scales have been scraped to the barest minimum, just enough to
guarantee the safest minimal complement, creating further concepts such as one-man
bridge. These conditions, which shape up the industry, have to be addressed in
casualty investigation reports.
Moreover, both the complexity of the system and the financial investment involved,
necessitate that reports address also latent failures, even at the design stage
(ergonomics included) if crucial. This is more than justified; but when expressed in
physical terms, this could mean reports that, for instance, run into volumes
containing hundreds of pages, most particularly if the casualty involves a large loss
of life or severe pollution204.

adopted by IMO in Resolution A.884(21). Braithwaite cautions that whilst the Hybrid model is
very valuable, however, its misapplication might jeopardise the entire scope of the investigation.
G. Braithwaite, The simpler it seems, the more you have forgotten…, (2002) at pp. 215-217.
According to Braithwaite, investigators have to be cautious because Reason’s model is a tool and
not an investigation methodology. He recalled that the Australian Bureau of Air Safety
Investigation (now ATSB) had encountered real difficulties when they attempted to use the
Hybrid model in the investigation of several major accidents. Personal communication with G.
Braithwaite March 24, 2003. (It is not the intention of this dissertation to study the implications
of the Hybrid model. An analysis of this matter requires a study of its own and certainly falls
beyond the scope of this dissertation).
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See C. Johnson, Improving Accident Reports, (1998) at p. 1.
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C. Johnson, ibid. at pp.14-15.

71

Logically, every casualty investigation report is presented in such a way that the
findings of the investigators follow the narrative and the analysis205. This approach
is acceptable and even recommended because the reader may reach his own
deductions without being biased by the investigators’ own conclusions. However,
this carries one major disadvantage; the reader has to go back and forth, scrolling
through the pages in an attempt to link the logic and conclusions with the evidence
supporting this analysis, and which should have been presented in the report206.
What applies to the reader of the report, be it a maritime administrator or a layman,
equally applies to the analysts of the IMO Casualty Analysis Correspondence Group
for Casualties. This would translate in a major problem since the responsibility of
the Correspondence Group is to identify acute accident circumstances/causes and
report them to other IMO Sub-Committees for information or appropriate action207.
Toft & Reynolds share the same view expressed above208. They identify at least the
following four typical drawbacks in large casualty investigation reports •

Difficulty to fully identify lessons learnt and their promulgation
throughout the industry;

•

Inconvenience to link events and analysis;

•

Investigators may not fully appreciate the implications of the evidence
available, especially if it weakens their own analysis; and the

•

Creation of blind spots, which may result in limiting the exploitation of
the analysis’ potential.

Since the importance of a link between hindsight and foresight has already been
established, then one would appreciate that inadequate reports will not serve the
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Ibid. at p. 13.
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Ibid.
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See D. Rabe, (2001) at p. 3.
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B. Toft & S. Reynolds, supra note 56 at p. 41.
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purpose of an input to the creation of simulator’s software, as shown above by the
different opinions brought together.
4.3.3

Events and causal factors charts

The Investigator’s Manual prepared by MAIIF, explains that one of the core
analytical techniques used during casualty investigation is the events and causal
factors chart209.
As the manual rightly affirms, the chart, which is constructed during the course of
the investigation, provides a chronological sequence or timeline of events, leading to
the accident. It is also being claimed that its benefits include •

Illustrating the sequence of events leading to the accident and the
conditions shaping these events;

•

Demonstrating the interaction between events and conditions and relation
of organisations and individuals;

•

Validating the results of other analytical techniques;

•

Presenting the information in such a way that it can be used to guide
report writing; and

•

Serving as an aid to summarise the key information regarding the
casualty and its causes in the investigation report.

Practice has shown that there is no setback in the use of the chart as an investigative
tool. The main problem lies, however, if the chart is utilised to summarise key
information at the end of a report210.
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MAIIF, Investigators Manual, (2002a) at pp. 56-57.
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Established investigating bodies such as NTSB have worked for years with this tool and it has
therefore stood the test of time and tens of investigations. However, whilst NTSB uses the chart
to investigate, it does not publish a simplified version, in all probability because it fears it may
give the impression of oversimplification.
This does not mean that other investigating bodies follow suit. ATSB are now well known to
publish events and causal factors charts at the end of its casualty investigation reports although it
is acknowledged that the chart only represents a simplified version of the actual chart built during
the investigation process. Discussion with K. Filor October 18, 2001.
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Therefore, the events and causal factors chart is adequate as an investigation tool
but this writer opines that there is a pitfall if the chart is used to summarise key
information. For instance, it fails to present contradictory evidence and analysis,
which are very frequently encountered during an investigation, especially where
interviews are concerned. Such contradictions might weaken the analysis of the
investigator and in order to create an impartial report for the readers, counter analysis
should be included in the report. If this is not done, then the reader will have to rely
solely on the analysis, conclusions and perspective of the investigator. Such reliance
will not assist e.g. in the study of human behaviour for the purpose of foresight
because the analyst might be influenced by what he has read211.
Several investigating bodies are obliged by their own national requirements to send a
report to the interested parties.

Other States do not have such requirements,

however, they abide by the IMO Code, Section 12, and send a draft copy to the
substantially interested States (and parties) for their “substantiated comments”.
Since modern reports address latent failures both at the line management and
organisational levels, it is expected that, for instance, the shipping company or the
flag/port State will send in their comments, which might not necessarily concur with
the findings of the report. Such submissions can also strengthen or weaken the
analysis of the investigator or question his interpretation. No matter what, to ensure
credibility, these submissions should be included in the report; an exercise that
cannot be facilitated e.g. by the application of the events and causal factors charts.
In addition, the chart fails to bring together the analysis and the supporting evidence.
This will leave no other option for the reader but to go back and forth in the report,
trying to establish the link himself212.
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T. Koester, supra note 184 at p. 6.
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4.4

Conclusion, Analysis, Evidence (CAE) Diagrams

Concerned and critical to these weaknesses, and to the possibility that reports may
not assist analysts as one would hope, Johnson discussed the CAE diagram concept
and its application to provide a “graphical overview of the arguments that are
presented in accident reports”213 but as yet, in a more detailed way than presented by
an events and causal factors chart. According to Johnson, CAE diagrams •

Link directly the analysis and the evidence presented in the report;

•

Enable the readers to remember interactions of the different elements
identified during the investigation;

•

Provide a “road-map” of the conclusions, supporting/complex analysis
and the related evidence;

•

Identify weakening evidence or analysis in reports and help discussions
concerning the consistency of the report;

•

Help the analyst to keep an open vision without being influenced by the
investigator; and

•

4.4.1

Serve as a means to promote corrective actions and recommendations214.
A Case Study

The above claims are the beneficial properties of CAE diagrams.

In order to

perceive how CAE diagrams operate, this writer selected a casualty investigation
report prepared by ATSB and constructed CAE diagrams based on the evidence and
analysis presented in the report215. The case study is presented in detail in Appendix
3 to this dissertation.

213

Ibid. at pp. 12-19.

214

This exercise requires the use of another tool - Questions, Options and Criteria (QOC) diagrams.

215

The selection of the report was based on the following criteria: to avoid hindsight bias, this writer
was not familiar with the events, investigation and analysis; it included submissions by interested
parties; it is a short report in view of the time constraints; it included an events and causal factors
chart and involved interactions of different operators at the sharp end. In addition to the CAE
diagrams, the events and causal factors chart is reproduced in Appendix 3 to help the reader
compare the chart and the diagrams.
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4.4.2

Evaluation of CAE diagrams constructed in the case study

The points that Johnson raised on CAE diagrams were identified when the case study
exercise was completed.

In addition, this writer linked submissions made by

interested parties and indeed, certain weaknesses in the report were then visible and
it was clear that either they had not been adequately addressed by the investigating
body or if otherwise, then justifications/analysis for omitting these comments had not
been provided, as explained in Appendix 3.
The above properties of CAE diagrams, which were also identified in this case study,
showed how 1.

Divergent views of witnesses can be brought together;

2.

A numbering system enables better management of analysis and/or
evidence and allows cross-referencing;

3.

Unsupported analysis can be identified;

4.

Analysis by those involved in the casualty may be included in the
diagram, even if not supporting the interpretation by the investigators;

5.

Areas of analysis contradicting other areas in the report become visible,
suggesting deeper or revised analysis to clarify these contradictions;

6.

Inconsistencies are identified e.g. lack of segregation between analysis
and conclusions; and how

7.

A single piece of evidence supports more than one analysis, indicating
the importance of a particular piece of evidence and suggests where
counter submissions may be expected, which if successful, will
undermine large parts of the report.
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Depending on the contents of the report, Johnson216 adds that 8.

CAE diagrams have the potential to indicate where the investigator fails
to segregate his own inferences and “facts for which there are
substantiated evidence”; and

9.

Analysis may be supported by evidence of different media, such as
photographs or Virtual Reality Markup Language (VRML) models,
which may also be included in the CAE diagrams217.

The use of CAE diagrams does carry disadvantages. The language used in casualty
investigation reports does not always make it possible to categorise a report into
conclusions, analysis and evidence218. This same difficulty was again encountered in
this case study, most particularly when constructing the CAE diagrams for
conclusions 1(b) and 3.
The use of the QOC tool referred to in footnote 214, implies that CAE diagrams fall
short of achieving the former tool’s function.

Furthermore, there are no

internationally agreed codified guidelines to help link CAE and QOC diagrams. This
may again prove to be a difficulty for the experts involved in foresight and who are
not acquainted with the use of this tool.
This writer encountered other difficulties when the diagrams were being constructed.
Although the report runs for 36 pages, it was impossible to fit the diagrams into a
single page because each conclusion requires a CAE diagram.

This problem

216

C. Johnson, Using CAE Diagrams to Visualise the Arguments in Accident Reports, (2001) at pp.
7, 12.

217

In this respect, Appendix 4 to this dissertation touches briefly on the electronic promulgation of
casualty investigation reports. This particular casualty investigation report, however, did not
include any photographs, which could have been utilised in Appendix 3, to illustrate this last
point.

218

C. Johnson, ibid. at pp. 18-19.
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becomes considerable if CAE diagrams had to be constructed for reports such as the
grounding of the Exxon Valdez, which runs into volumes219.
This does not mean that it would prove impossible to construct CAE diagrams for
voluminous reports but it does certainly mean that the diagrams will be numerous,
complex and would have to be presented in a dedicated section of the report.
Notwithstanding, the advantages of bringing together evidence, analysis and
conclusions may still be appreciated.
Intentionally, the events and causal factors chart is presented adjacent to the CAE
diagrams in Appendix 3 to this dissertation.

One major disadvantage of CAE

diagrams stands out. The former indicates a sequence of events in chronological
order, a characteristic that is lost altogether in CAE diagrams.
Therefore, it would be appropriate that a report should present a chart, which is
complimentary to the diagrams, and thus minimising on each of their limitations. In
his research, however, this writer has not come across any casualty investigation
reports with annexed CAE diagrams, suggesting that the use of this tool is not
widespread220.

219

Johnson acknowledges this point but views it from the perspective that the longer the report, the
more justified it is to adopt CAE diagrams in order to overcome the problems present in
conventional reports. See ibid. at p. 19.

220

This is one scope of this writer. It is aspired that this dissertation makes casualty investigators
aware of another tool, which although has its limitations and may require improvements,
however, it has the potential of enhancing casualty investigation reports and assist in the
achievement of foresight, thereby satisfying the purpose of the IMO Code.
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4.5

Linking Hindsight to Foresight

The maritime industry at large has realised that casualty investigation reports serve to
convey safety recommendations. It is claimed that the impetus is the strong moral
demand, considering the cost of hindsight, be it in human life or mitigation of
environmental pollution221.
Efforts should not be therefore directed towards achieving this concept. The real
issue is how to communicate the information, which is gathered during the course of
the investigation. It has been stated that scholars believe that in all probability, most
of the data available is inadequate to serve the purpose of foresight. Several research
books have been published in an attempt to visualise this problem and to present a
solution. This chapter, on the other, hand emphasises the presentation of the findings
in reports and brought together research by various academic writers in this respect.
International co-operation between IMO Member States does not end when the
report has been sent to IMO. That stage would only mean that the flag State has
diligently executed its duties as required by international conventions. International
co-operation now goes beyond i.e. reaching an agreement (or a compromise) on the
corrective actions, recommended in adequate and high quality reports.
Linking hindsight to foresight, one scholar asserts that “without naturalistic facts,
experimental work may become narrow and blind; but without experimental
research, the naturalistic approach runs the danger of being shallow and
uncertain”222.
Figure 4.5a plots the focus of this chapter i.e. how hindsight should operate with
foresight in a bid to enhance international co-operation and improve the
implementation of the IMO Code. It also illustrates how the conclusions reached
from the analysis of data and events contribute to hindsight.

221

B. Toft & S. Reynolds, supra note 56 at p. 24.

222

B. J. Baars, Eliciting Predictable Speech Errors in the Laboratory, (1980) at pp. 307-318.
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Linking Hindsight to Foresight.
Adapted from B. Toft & S. Reynolds, 1997 at p. 56.

Another input to hindsight is isomorphism; accidents, happening in what appears to
be different complex systems but share the same basic components that make them
susceptible to similar failures223. Foresight has three inputs; hindsight, scientific
models and simulation (which have also been referred to in this chapter as
experimental and quasi-experimental methods). The other important function of
hindsight (and isomorphism) is shown using dotted lines; they act as a feedback and
a control for the model and simulation so as to ensure a realistic approach.
A proactive exercise will transform into a better safety policy, only if foresight has
been built up on a detailed study of hindsight224. What is being emphasised is the
quality of hindsight, which will have a direct bearing on the quality of foresight.
A specific reference is made to the tendency of resisting a cultural change because it
is believed that an accident can happen once and only to specific organisations. A
223

B. Toft & S. Reynolds, supra note 56 at p. 16.

224

R. Marí, supra note 198.
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thorough safety investigation report, with clear, supported conclusions not only
serves the promulgation of information but also facilitates overcoming this
misconception.
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CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS
5.1

The Start of a Process…

The dissertation has attempted to steer the reader through a study of three
fundamental aspects of maritime casualty investigation. It has sought to demonstrate
that if an investigation is not managed properly, it will fail to reflect the aim, share
the purpose and reach the objective of the IMO Code. The study has revealed that
the fulcrum is hindsight, which per se is a major input to foresight. It has shown how
hindsight cannot be achieved through excessive political reactions, be it in the form
of finger pointing, blaming or hindsight bias. This dissertation has also explained
that the investigating bodies are the major players and that their policies will
definitely administer the analysis process.
Figure 5.1a brings together these three aspects and assembles all three figures
previously discussed in the foregoing chapters. As it can be observed, in addition to
providing a link of how any one of these three domains may influence a safety
investigation, the figure implies that foresight is only the start of another process,
which if diligently applied, will lead to active foresight225.

Toft & Reynolds

accentuate that the reaction of an organisation, influenced by a disaster, may also act
as a lever to promote foresight226.

225

B. Toft & S. Reynolds, supra note 56 at p. 58.

226

This writer of the opinion, however, that the reaction of an organisation involved in a disaster is
only a secondary issue. In reality, the lever is what this writer calls ‘organisational intrinsic
values’ i.e. how safety conscious an organisation is and how high are maritime safety and
environmental protection on its priority list. These two criteria THEN determine the reaction of
an organisation. Only intrinsic values (and financial considerations) will establish how sensitive
an organisation is to the effects of a disaster. Again, that emphasises the importance of casualty
investigation reports and the promulgation of well-supported findings and conclusions.
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The figure suggests that if the recommendations made by the investigation (which
must be reasonable and in proportion to the magnitude of the disaster and its effects)
are neither adopted nor implemented, then the learning will remain passive, the
barriers against mishap will not be enforced and latent failures will not be mitigated.
The decision to remain passive is like all other fallible decisions at the organisational
level.

Thus, not only latent failures were not mitigated, but the industry’s

passiveness is also transformed into a latent failure. The other possibility is based on
the recommendations drawn up by the investigating body and the generated
foresight. This is potential active learning227 and is when corrective actions are
taken.

5.2

Active Foresight and the IMO Code

In line with Toft & Reynolds’ definition, active foresight is the stage where based on
potential active learning, the industry applies in practice the recommendations, with
an objective of preventing similar casualties in the future. This is also the objective
of the IMO Code and it heralds the stage where a cultural change has taken place.
The maritime industry may be sceptic of ever achieving this stage. Perhaps this is
because of the time frame required by such a process. Furthermore, latent failures
are inexorable in complex systems. Human error is both a cause and a consequence.
At the sharp end, human error is a consequence of other human errors committed
higher up in the organisational hierarchy. That, however, should not mean that the
aim and purpose of the IMO Code are discarded, even if from time to time it may
require amendments in order to address the changes in the perspective of the
maritime industry towards casualty investigation.

227

B. Toft & S. Reynolds, ibid. at p. 55. Toft & Reynolds identify potential active learning as a
process, the result of which determines the response of an organisation to recommendations made
by an investigating body. Safety by compulsion is also an indirect input to potential active
learning. However, as discussed in chapter 2, unless the compulsion factor is short-termed or
interim – at least until justified by the findings of the casualty investigation report, then a decision
will qualify as a spontaneous reaction and may be fallible. Also see ibid. at p. 79.
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The aim of this dissertation is to capture and discuss similar and divergent
views/beliefs and it has exposed inadequacies in the way the maritime industry
operates vis-à-vis casualty investigations. As it has always been, the implementation
of the IMO Code to promote thorough safety investigations will depend entirely on
the willpower, determination and beliefs of the IMO Member States.
It is aspired that by achieving the objective of the IMO Code, the burden on the
maritime industry is alleviated. It would be an unfortunate setback if the very same
industry were to pose a threat to its implementation.
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APPENDIX 1

THE ADOPTION OF THE IMO CODE AND THE
RIGHTS

AND

OBLIGATIONS

UNDER

PUBLIC

INTERNATIONAL LAW
i.

IMO Resolutions Prior to A.849(20)

The adoption of IMO Resolution A.849(20) meant the revocation of three Assembly
Resolutions, all related to casualty investigation228.
The first step towards consultation between States materialised in 1968, in the wake
of the Torrey Canyon casualty. A draft resolution, approved by MSC, was adopted
by IMCO Assembly as A.173(ES.IV) in November 1968229. Following further very
serious casualties, IMCO Assembly adopted one more Resolution, which was related
to casualty investigation and international co-operation - A.440(XI), following the
Amoco Cadiz grounding and subsequent severe pollution. Later, IMO Assembly
adopted Resolution A.637(16), in the aftermath of the Exxon Valdez grounding230.
Further to being somewhat limited in scope, these Assembly Resolutions had several
shortcomings.

Deschênes231 refers to Resolution A.173(ES.IV) and whilst

acknowledging that it recommended the participation of a coastal State in casualty
investigations, especially if oil pollution occurs, he specified that the Resolution
applied only when a public inquiry was held, but did not apply in the following
situations •

Preliminary or formal inquiries;

•

Collisions; and

228

The Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO) Assembly had also
adopted two more Resolutions, which, however, have not been revoked by Resolution A.849(20),
as amended. The Assembly adopted Resolution A.322 at its ninth Session: “The Supply of
Information and Findings Concerning Serious Casualties”. Resolution A.442 on “The Provision
of Personnel and Material Resources for the Investigation of Casualties and the Contravention of
Conventions” was adopted by the Assembly’s eleventh Session.

229

See IMO, 1982. Until May 22, 1982, the Organization was known as IMCO.

230

F. L. Wiswall, Legal Aspects of Maritime Casualty Investigation, (2003a).

231

B. M. Deschênes, supra note 5 at pp. 140-141. See also A.173(ES.IV), Participation in Official
Inquiries into Maritime Casualties, (IMO, 1969).
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•

If a national of the coastal State was commercially interested in either the
ship and/or its cargo.

Analysing IMO Resolution A.637(16), one writer described it as an “international
determination to achieve cooperation between different states in investigative
matters”232. Nevertheless, he emphasised that the Resolution left “many questions
unanswered”. For instance •

Like all other resolutions, rather than imposing obligations, Resolution
A.637(16) only made recommendations233;

•

Only the State conducting the investigation had the right to decide if or
when to publicise a casualty investigation report (especially if the
findings would have had adverse conditions on the government of that
State);

•

It did not determine which were the substantially interested States and
left such important decision at the discretion of the State carrying out the
investigation; and

•

The Resolution emphasised the role of the flag State, without giving
equal importance to the role of substantially interested States.

In a paper submitted to the FSI Sub-Committee, Australia highlighted three serious
weaknesses of the same Assembly Resolution234. The identified weaknesses were 1.

The disregarding of the importance of consistency in investigations;

2.

The lack of identification of the purpose and principles of a safety
investigation especially when two or more states were involved; and

232

M. J. Sobey, supra note 81 at pp. 3-29. See also A.637(16), Co-operation in Maritime Casualty
Investigations, (IMO, 1990). IMO Resolution A.637(16) was adopted on October 19, 1989.

233

This notion of soft law and its implications on the implementation of the IMO Code is addressed
in chapter 2 of this dissertation.

234

FSI 3/5/4, Casualty Statistics and Investigations. Common Principles in Official Marine
Accident Investigations, submitted by Australia, (IMO, 1994b).

103

3.

Serious inconsistencies in the same Resolution (such as the terms
“official inquiry”, “official investigation” or “casualty investigation”), all
of which would have different legal interpretations under different legal
systems.

It was more than clear that Resolution A.637(17) had not succeeded to promote
international cooperation; at least not to the extent which one would have preferred
and it was only a matter of time until another Resolution would have to be drafted
and adopted.

ii.

The FSI Sub-Committee and the Adoption of the IMO Code

Casualty investigation remained high on the priority list of the IMO agenda. The
MSC, at its sixty-first Session, agreed to establish the FSI Sub-Committee, which
with the concurrence of MEPC at its thirty-third Session, had to report to both
Committees.
Since its first Session, the FSI Sub-Committee considered, inter alia, establishing a
permanent Casualty Analyses Correspondence Group235. To date, this Group still
carries out invaluable work in analysing casualty investigation reports submitted to
IMO and provides technical co-operation needs by identifying trends and the need to
amend regulations236.
Retrieved IMO papers show that the first strong comments, which led to the adoption
of the IMO Code in 1997, were made at the MSC sixty-third Session, when the
Committee requested IMO Member States to make submissions in respect of

235

FSI 1/21, Report to the Maritime Safety Committee and the Marine Environment Protection
Committee, (IMO, 1993).

236

FSI 9/19, Report to the Maritime Safety Committee and the Marine Environment Protection
Committee, (IMO, 2001a). With respect to this point, chapter 4 addresses the importance of
casualty investigation reports.
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improving international procedures and practices in official marine incidents and
accident investigations237.
As a result, Australia submitted document FSI 3/5/4 to the Sub-Committee,
acknowledging, inter alia, that the “incompatible nature of different legal principles
and procedures by sovereign States” may impede a safety investigation238. In this
respect, Australia suggested a code, which would be enforced through the provisions
of the SOLAS 1974 Convention. The first ever draft of the IMO Code was annexed
to the document for the debates of the Sub-Committee.
Following an interesting discussion at the third FSI Session, the Sub-Committee
established a Correspondence Group under the chairmanship of Australia, which was
instructed to prepare the necessary drafting. The Correspondence Group worked on
these terms of reference and at the fourth FSI Session, Australia submitted the report
of the Group239. A draft code and a draft Assembly resolution were annexed to the
document for consideration and approval before being sent to MSC and MEPC.
Following further debates at the FSI fourth Session and more re-drafting between the
FSI fourth and fifth Sessions, the FSI Sub-Committee agreed at its fifth Session to
recommend MSC and MEPC to endorse the draft Assembly resolution and the code
so that the resolution will be adopted by the IMO Assembly240.
Subsequently, on November 27, 1997, the twentieth IMO Assembly adopted the
Code as an annex to IMO Resolution A.849241.
237

MSC 63/23, Report of the Maritime Safety Committee on its Sixty-Third Session, (IMO, 1994a).

238

IMO, supra note 234.

239

FSI 4/5/1, Casualty Statistics and Investigations. Improved International Standards. Draft Code
of International Standards and Recommended Practices in Marine Accident Investigation.
Report of the Correspondence Group, submitted by Australia, (IMO, 1995).

240

MSC 68/7/1, Flag State Implementation. Draft Code for the Investigation of Marine Casualties
and Incidents: submitted by Australia on behalf of the Working Group on Casualty Statistics and
Investigations, (IMO, 1997a).

241

Since its adoption, IMO Resolution A.849(20) was amended once in 1999 by IMO Resolution
A.884(21). The IMO Code became Annex 1 to the Resolution and Annex 2 was incorporated.
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iii. The Aims and Objective of the IMO Code

Section 1.2 of the IMO Code determines the aims, which are •

A common approach towards safety casualty investigation; and

•

The promotion of co-operation between States.

On the other hand, the objective of the IMO Code is established in Section 2, which
is the prevention of similar casualties in the future.
These three points are now synonymous with the IMO Code and although scholars
believe that it is a single step, they concur, however, that it is in the right direction242.
The role of the investigator is precisely defined in these words and his objective has
to reflect the objective of the IMO Code. Lang opines that “…it falls to the marine
accident investigator to identify the component parts of {this} causal chain and to
explain what happened with a view to prevent it happening again...”243. By adopting
the IMO Code, the United Nations (UN) Specialised Agency had expressed its
concern that casualty investigation deserved top priority on the Member States’
agenda244. This is so because it was acknowledged that casualty investigations had
four very important functions i.e. “scientific, legal, educational and practical”
functions245.

242

J.-U. Schröder & G. Zade, supra note 190 at p. 288.

243

J. Lang, The Marine Accident Investigator’s Perspective, (2000a).

244

J.-U. Schröder & G. Zade, ibid. at p. 287.

245

Ibid.
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iv. The IMO Code and International Convention Law

Whilst the IMO Code is not mandatory, however, rather than being read as a
freestanding document, it has to be read in conjunction with international
Conventions, which are in force246.

The remaining sections of this Appendix

indicate the international maritime conventions, which prescribe the obligations of
flag States to investigate casualties onboard ships entitled to fly their flags. These
conventions also determine the right of port and coastal States to investigate
casualties onboard ships sailing in waters where these States either have sovereignty
or else can exercise jurisdictional powers.

v.

Casualty Investigation: The Obligations of Flag States and the Rights of Port
and Coastal States

The implementation of international maritime conventions is achieved by •

Compliance; the primary responsibility of which rests with the shipowner
and his servants; and

•

Enforcement, which falls within the responsibility of the flag State.

Enforcement has two components - preventive and remedial. Undeniably, casualty
investigation falls within the remedial component247.

vi. Investigations under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas

(UNCLOS)
The duties of a flag State are primarily prescribed in UNCLOS, Article 94, which
lays down the extent of flag State jurisdiction over ships entitled to fly its flag.
Under the prescribed conditions, Paragraph 7 imposes an obligation on flag States to
investigate casualties and incidents of navigation on the high seas. Of striking

246

F. L. Wiswall, supra note 230.

247

Discussion with P. K. Mukherjee October 03, 2002. Chapter 4 of this dissertation analyses how
the remedial component does not necessarily mean that there is no room for a proactive approach.
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importance is the accentuation on co-operation between the flag State and other
interested State/s in the conduct of the “inquiry”248.
In addition to Article 94, UNCLOS, Articles 97, 217, 218, 220, 221 and 226, relate
to ‘investigations’249. The term ‘investigations’ incorporates •

Processes initiated to determine the seaworthiness of a ship (irrelevant of
whether or not that ship has committed a violation of international rules
and standards); and

•

Maritime casualties (referred to in UNCLOS, Article 221).

Kasoulides notes that UNCLOS, Article 94 imposes no requirements on the flag
State to publish the inquiry reports but is of the opinion that the requirement for cooperation includes the access to evidence/records and the location of the casualty250.
UNCLOS imposes no obligations on the coastal and port States to investigate
casualties onboard foreign ships. On the other hand, out of self-interest, they have an
inherent right to investigate and therefore enjoy concurrent jurisdiction with the flag
State, within the parameters prescribed in international law.

vii. The Provisions of International Convention Law

The SOLAS 1974 Convention251, Regulation I/21; MARPOL 1973/1978
Convention252, Article 12; the Loadline Convention of 1966253, Article 23 and the
STCW Convention254, Regulation I/5, relate to casualty investigation. The SOLAS
1974 Convention and the Loadline Convention of 1966 require investigations into
those cases, which indicate that the regulations prescribed in the respective
248

UN, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, (1982).

249

F. L. Wiswall, Relevant Provisions of Conventional International Law, (2003b).

250

G. C. Kasoulides, Port State Control: Evolution of the Port State Regime, 1998 at p. 64.

251

IMO, supra note 77.

252

IMO, MARPOL 1973/78, (IMO, 2002e).

253

IMO, Load Lines 1966, (IMO, 1966).

254

IMO, supra note 145.
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convention may be amended. The MARPOL 1973/1978 Convention requires an
investigation into those casualties, which have “produced a major deleterious effect
upon the marine environment”255. Moreover, the STCW Convention, Regulation I/5
refers to investigations related to incompetency, acts or omissions256.
It is only the SOLAS 1974 Convention, which refers to various Assembly
Resolutions related to casualty investigation, including Resolution A.849(20). This
footnote reference does not, however, make the IMO Code mandatory in anyway,
unless it has been incorporated in the national maritime legislation of a contracting
Party to the SOLAS 1974 Convention.
The Conventions emanating from the International Labour Organization (ILO) also
refer to investigations and inquiries into occupational accidents, serious casualties257
and near-casualties. Nonetheless, it is appropriate to refer to ILO C147, ‘Merchant
Shipping (Minimum Standards) Convention, 1976, since this Convention is unique;
incorporating 15 other ILO Conventions in its Appendix.

In Article 2, the

Convention also calls for official inquiries into serious marine casualties.

255

See IMO, supra note 252.

256

In addition to these IMO Conventions, Article 7 of the 1977 Torremolinos International
Convention on the Safety of Fishing Vessels also requires, inter alia, investigations on fishing
vessels to which the Convention applies. However, to date, this Convention has not yet entered
into force.

257

The definition of ‘serious casualties’ as given in ILO instruments does not relate to the definition
of ‘serious casualties’ in the IMO Code.
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viii. The Interaction between the Flag State and the Port and Coastal States

Casualty investigation is conducted by States, either because they have the right to
investigate or else because there is a prescribed obligation. The rights or duties
afforded by international convention law (which then have to be reflected in the
municipal law of a contracting Party) give effect to the interaction of States, even if
they do not share a common agenda258.

258

Thus, international conventions express the duty of the flag State to initiate an investigation, be it
criminal, administrative, safety related or a simple ‘fact-finding’ task. Within the boundaries
determined by international law, the port and coastal States have the inherent right to investigate
casualties onboard foreign ships, which therefore leads to an interaction between States. The
problem, which may arise from States having different objectives to reach, is analysed in chapter
3 of this dissertation.
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APPENDIX 2

FRONT COVER OF THE INTERIM FRENCH BEAMER REPORT ON THE LOSS OF THE MOTOR
TANKER ERIKA
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APPENDIX 3

CASE STUDY259

Grounding of the Malaysian flag container ship Bunga Teratai Satu on Sudbury
Reef, Great Barrier Reef, November 02, 2000.
Background to the Casualty
Following is an extract of the summary presented in the ATSB report260 …At 0600, ‘full away’ was rung and the vessel resumed its passage to Sydney on a
course of 1200 (true). A programmed way-point, at position 160 52.8’S, 1460 02.3’E,
was reached at 0700. At this way-point, the course was supposed to be altered to 1640
(true) to round Fitzroy Island and take the vessel to the west of Sudbury Reef.
However, no course alteration was made.
The ship was reporting under REEFREP, administered from Reefcentre, Hay Point.
This system requires ships transiting the inner route to report at certain positions
within the inner route.

To help enforce compliance with pilotage and reporting

requirements the normal entry points to the inner route are monitored by radar. In the
limited areas covered by radar, the system fulfils a secondary, monitoring role, to
improve safe navigation.
At about 0723, the ship struck the north end of Sudbury Reef at a speed of over 20
knots on a heading of 1200…
The investigation found that the significant unsafe act that resulted in the grounding
was the inattention of the mate on watch aboard Bunga Teratai Satu…however, a
number of other contributing factors led to a breakdown in the defences and
protections that may have prevented the ship from grounding.

259

ATSB Report 162 was selected because it met the criteria identified in chapter 4, section 4.4.1 of
this dissertation. It is not the intention of this writer to question the extent and integrity of the
investigation. The analysis of this report is carried out within the context of ATSB’s Policy.
Hence, its selection suggests that indeed, the report perfectly serves the purpose of an educational
tool.

260

ATSB, supra note 98 at p. 1.
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Figure 3i:
Source:

Bunga Teratai Satu’s Passage Plan and Track.
ATSB, 2000.
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The ATSB report is divided into nine sections, the main ones including the narrative
from pp. 3 to 12; comment and analysis from pp. 15 to 29; conclusions on p. 31;
recommendations on p. 32 and submissions from pp. 33 to 35. A simplified events
and causal factors chart was reproduced on p. 30.

Constructing the CAE Diagrams
The following procedure, adopted from Johnson261 was used to construct the CAE
diagrams 1.

All the conclusions of the report were listed down;

2.

The analysis from which the conclusions developed were identified;

3.

The evidence supporting or contradicting the analysis was noted; and

4.

All three main elements of the CAE diagrams were linked together.

Links are drawn in solid lines. Dotted lines represent links, which weaken/contradict
the analysis of the investigator. Each text box is numbered and the page numbers are
also inserted at the bottom of the text box so that reader can refer directly to the
report. Furthermore, there were cases where one set of evidence supported multiple
analyses and as can be seen, the identification number will prove indispensable.
Dotted text boxes indicate missing evidence detected by CAE diagrams.
Since there are seven identified contributing factors in the report, then there have to
be at least seven CAE diagrams, one for each conclusion262. There are two sets of

261

C. Johnson, supra note 216 at p. 3.

262

In reality, the report identifies nine conclusions on p. 31. The conclusions’ section is introduced
as, “{t}hese conclusions identify different factors contributing to the grounding…”. However,
ATSB refer to a possible advice from Reefcentre operator and the radar units, in conclusions 8
and 9 respectively and determine that: “It is unlikely that any advice would have altered the
course of events and the radar units were operating within the designed parameters”. See ATSB,
supra note 98 at p. 31.
Thus, although these two conclusions imply that neither the lack of advice from the operator nor
the consistent running of the radars contributed to the casualty, they are still listed under the
conclusions’ section. In this respect and for the purpose of the case study, the last two
conclusions were omitted.
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CAE diagrams for conclusion 1, in view of the detailed analyses and several
evidence related to this conclusion.
The text in the boxes is reproduced verbatim, ensuring that both the meaning and the
interpretation conveyed by the investigators to the reader remain unaltered. The
numbering sequence is irrelevant and it will vary from one analyst to another. The
most important feature is that cross-references are accurate and relate to their
respective analysis and evidence263.
It is imperative to note that CAE diagrams are not intended to replace casualty
investigation reports.

As it is commented in chapter 4, CAE diagrams should

compliment the report, rather than make it redundant.

263

The term ‘MISC’, which may be encountered in the CAE text boxes is an acronym used by
ATSB for the shipping company owning the Bunga Teratai Satu. At the time of the casualty, the
same company was responsible for the operation of the vessel. This writer refers to ‘MISC’ as
the ‘Shipping Company’.
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C1: Distraction of
the chief mate from
the navigation of
the ship led to the
grounding. (Pg 31)

A1: The mate went out onto
the Stb. bridge wing and
made a call on his mobile
phone. Soon afterwards, at
about
0655,
the
mate
returned to the wheelhouse
and called his cabin on the
internal phone, asking his
wife to come to the bridge.
She arrived a few minutes
later and the two of them
went out on the Stb. bridge
wing before making another
call on the mate's mobile to
his mother-in-law's house in
Karachi. (Pg 8)

A2: Soon after the grounding
the mate wrote a statement to
MISC claiming abdominal pains
had forced him to go to the
lavatory after which he forgot to
alter course. Chief mate - (Pg
16)

E1: The master recalled
that he heard the mate's
cabin door close at
about 0655. (Pg 17)

E2: The AB recalled that
the mate and his wife
went to the starboard
bridge wing sometime
before 0700, while he
was using the vacuum
cleaner.
They closed
the sliding door, he
assumed, to stop the
noise of the cleaner
interfering with their
phone
conversation.
(Pg 17)

E3: The Telstra records
show that at 0703:55 a
call was placed through
the 'Phone-away' service
with a duration of 10
minutes 45 seconds.
The call finished at
0714:40. (Pg 17)

Figure 3ii

CAE Diagram for Conclusion 1(a).

Figure 3ii shows that the report presents two possible analysis; A1 and A2, both of
which may explain the distraction of the chief mate. The evidence collected during
the course of the investigation (E1, E2, E3), however, determined that analysis A2 is
not plausible. Therefore, all the evidence that is weakening analysis A2 is linked to
the latter in dotted lines. It can also be noted that the same evidence, (E1, E2, E3)
substantiate analysis A1. This supports the investigators’ findings that the chief mate
was distracted because of telephone calls made to his home country from the ship’s
starboard bridge wing. Since A2 is intended to weaken the analysis made by the
investigating team, then the source is identified for the benefit of the reader.
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A17: The mate was
extremely experienced,
held a certificate of
competency one grade
higher than the rank he
was serving and had
been sailing on the
Bunga Teratai Satu for
the previous four months
with
no
adverse
comments
from
his
previous
or
current
masters.
The mate's
performance
was
monitored throughout his
service
with
the
company, in accordance
with the SMS. Shipping
Company - (Pg 34)

A15:
The
mate,
though appropriately
qualified, lacked the
proper
level
of
motivation to operate
in
a
professional
manner. (Pg 22)

A16: From the time
the master left the
bridge at 0635, when
Green Island was just
forward of the port
beam, the ship was
travelling towards a
featureless
horizon
with no visual cues to
mark the reef. Had
there been something
such as a beacon to
stimulate the mate
from his reverie or
alert the lookout, then
they may have reacted
to save the situation.
(Pg 24)

E10: Much of the reef
south of Grafton passage
is submerged at all
states of tide. There are
therefore few features to
the east of the track to
give a visual reference of
the reef edge. (Pg 24)

A1: (page 8)
E1: (page 17)
C1: Distraction of
the chief mate from
the navigation of the
ship led to the
grounding. (Pg 31)

E2: (page 17)

E3: (page 17)

A2: (page 16)

Figure 3iii

CAE Diagram for Conclusion 1(b).
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A18: The situation was
such that the ship was
not in confined waters
and
therefore
one
straight
alteration
of
course, with a safety
margin of 20 minutes
before running into a
danger, should be no
more
than
could
reasonably be expected
of a mate with so many
years of experience and
a master's foreign-going
licence.
Shipping
Company - (Pg 33)

A19: If the mate was
conducting
himself
properly,
such
a
consideration should not
be necessary. ATSB (Pg 24)

Figure 3iii plots an excellent example to illustrate the multiple functions of CAE
diagrams.
The distraction of the chief mate was a major contributing factor to the casualty and
this explains why the report dedicates so much energy analysing the chief mate’s
behaviour. The CAE diagram in figure 3ii (which also refers to the first conclusion
reached by ATSB) has been linked to this diagram on the lower left hand side of
figure 3iii, suggesting the importance of accurate labelling of the text boxes.
According to the report, other analysis (A15 and A16) support C1, based on the
evidence available to the investigation (E10). However, the CAE diagram highlights
that A15 is not supported by any evidence and this shortcoming could suggest that
the analysis is subjective. In fact, the shipping company contested the analysis. A17
and A18 represent the submissions made by the shipping company in relation to
analysis A15 and A16. Since the company questioned the analysis made by ATSB,
the links are represented in dotted lines.
The CAE diagram also shows what seems to be a contradiction in the analysis. The
analysis points out that there is no visual reference of the reef edge, which could
have spared those involved from the ordeal by attracting the attention of the chief
mate and/or the look out; referring to the horizon as “featureless”, even because the
reef is submerged at all states of the tide264.
However, the investigators then cast doubt on their own analysis by remarking {t}here should be no need for marks on the east side of the channel as there are lights
and prominent radar targets with which the ship’s position can be fixed. Also, as in
the case of Bunga Teratai Satu most ships now have the capability of fixing their
position with utmost accuracy by GPS.

264

ATSB, supra note 98 at p. 24
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The report adds, “…if the mate was conducting himself properly, such a
consideration should not be necessary”265.
This unclear analysis is more outstanding when the CAE diagram is constructed and
the latter therefore suggests further studies into the behaviour of the chief mate even
because although the point was raised, the ‘featureless horizon’ was not considered a
contributing factor to the grounding. Thus, unless explaining where an analysis is
intended to lead, the report might not serve the analyst who is trying to build
foresight.
Figures 3ii and 3iii have shown that the dotted lines serve three purposes •

In figure 3ii, ‘weakening’ arguments were reported on purpose by ATSB
to give more weight to its own analysis;

•

Figure 3iii shows other analysis made by the shipping company, which
question the analysis reached in the report; and

•

The diagram in figure 3iii has highlighted an unclear analysis that leads
the reader to no conclusion.

265

ATSB, ibid.
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C2: From about 0645 to
0715, the mate had become
preoccupied with arranging
and making private telephone
calls when the ship was in
cellular range of the coast,
rather than monitoring the
ship's course, speed, position
and his other watch keeping
duties. (Pg 31)

A2: (page 16)

A3: South of Fitzroy
Island
the
ship
would be out of
range of mobile
phone coverage for
some time.
The
alternative
would
have been to place
a call via the
maritime
system
Inmarsat
A
at
$6.30/min. (Pg 17)

A21: {ISM} procedures
are an important part of
any operational safety
systems.
They are,
however, also one of the
least effective forms of
safety
assurance.
Procedural documents
do not usually make
interesting reading. (Pg
22)

Figure 3iv

E12:
The
master
checked the
chart
and
saw that the
last position
had
been
plotted
at
0700. (Pg 8)

E4: From the Telstra
records,
it
was
established that the
mate made an initial
call on his mobile
phone to the Telstra
'Phone-away' service
at 0644:01. The call
lasted for 2 minutes
and 25 seconds. He
made a further two
calls, one at 0650:02
lasting 19 seconds
and a further call at
0651:51
lasting
1
minute 17 seconds.
(Pg 17)

E13: International
non-compliance
with
procedures
(violations) is a
major
safety
problem and may
be involved in up to
70% of accidents in
some
industries.
(Pg 22)

CAE Diagram for Conclusion 2.

Figure 3iv confirms that the evidence gathered from ‘Telstra’ supports the conclusion
that the chief mate was in fact pre-occupied with the telephone calls rather than his
watch keeping duties.

In so doing, it validates analysis A3 and intentionally

disqualifies analysis A2 and gives more credibility to the casualty investigation
report. In view of the different time frame, evidence E4 is not included in the CAE
diagram in figure 3ii.
Text box A21 presents the analysis made in the report, concerning the ISM
procedures vis-à-vis the officer of the watch.

This analysis was made by the

investigators to point out that the chief mate did not check the ship’s course, position
and speed as required by the Company’s SMS.
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A20: Analysis and
interpretation
of
expert’s evidence.

C3: The manner in which
the mate maintained his
watch on 02/11/00, lacked
appropriate motivation and
fell well below proper
professional standard. (Pg
31)

E1: (page 17)

A1: (page 8)

E2: (page 17)

A17: (page 34)

E3: (page 17)

A22: The mate, apart from
being distracted by the
phone
conversation
apparently relied on the GPS
navigator to fix the ship’s
position, ignoring navigation
by visual cross bearing or
radar. (Pg 18)

Figure 3v

E11: Evidence
identified and
extracted by
expert.

E12: (page 8)

CAE Diagram for Conclusion 3.

The CAE diagram in figure 3v identifies a very serious inconsistency in the casualty
investigation report. The alleged lack of motivation and proper professional standard
were included as a conclusion (and contributing factor) at the end of the report (C3).
However, it may be recalled that this alleged lack of motivation by the chief mate
was also considered part of the analysis (A15) on page 22 of the report and was
therefore classified as such in figure 3iii. Such an approach is questionable because
the CAE diagrams indicate that the report now suggests that conclusion C3 supports
another conclusion (C1). Conclusions are not supported by other conclusions but by
analysis, which on the other hand are constructed on gathered evidence.
This is one of the difficulties encountered by this writer whilst constructing the CAE
diagrams. It is one instant, which shows that there is no complete segregation
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between the conclusions and analysis in the report, which in turn may confuse the
reader. CAE diagrams have the property of bringing out these shortcomings before
the report is published.
The CAE diagrams in this appendix bring together nothing more than the
conclusions, analysis and evidence published in the report.

For instance, the

investigation has reached its conclusion (C3) after doing analysis A1, based on
evidence E1, E2 and E3. Experts who studied theories of management (which also
encompasses motivation techniques) might debate the analysis and consider it as
superficial or even subjective and again, this point is very clear in the CAE diagram
in figure 3v. Dixon advanced an important point on motivation; an individual who
has failed to perform as expected does not necessarily mean that he suddenly lacks
motivation266; not to mention Bainbridge’s observation on the ironies of
automation267.
The theories of motivation have been developed as far back as Maslow (1954). The
evidence required by the investigating team would extend from the company’s policy
to the working conditions and even beyond. It is only then, that the expert in
management theories is able to analyse the evidence, apply these theories and come
up with his conclusions.
Unfortunately, although the shipping company disputed this conclusion (A17), the
report falls short of explaining why its submission was overruled by ATSB. Whilst
noting that there is no obligation whatsoever, yet, it is believed that including
expanded explanation will minimise uncertainty and give more weight to the
investigators’ analysis.
The text boxes representing evidence E11 and analysis A20 are dashed, to show the
investigators that there is missing evidence, especially for the analyses of motivation.
If the ‘SHEL’ model in Annex 2 to the IMO Code is applied, then the investigators
266

R. Dixon, supra note 10 at p. 72.

267

See chapter 4, section 4.1.1 of this dissertation.
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will have to refer back to the components of the model and determine where the
liveware mismatched with the remaining components of the model to justify the
analysis represented in text box A20.
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C4: The ship's GPS crosstrack error alarm was neither
loud nor strident enough to
attract urgent attention. (Pg
31)

Figure 3vi

A4: It should be
pointed out that the
GPS alarm is not loud
and is identical for all
alarms
conditions.
The alarm cannot be
heard on the bridge
wing, or over the
noise of the vacuum
cleaner when the
bridge
is
being
cleaned. (Pg 20)

E5: Noise level
measurement test.

A5: The alarm was (and
still is) demonstrably
loud enough to be
heard throughout the
wheelhouse. The fact
that the mate chose to
ignore the alarm (at
whatever volume
it
sounded) is surely a
failure, not of the
equipment
or
the
management of the
vessel but of the mate
himself.
Shipping
Company - (Pg 34)

CAE Diagram for Conclusion 4.

Figure 3vi shows another area where the language used in the report is not clear
enough to distinguish between a conclusion and an analysis.

For instance,

conclusion C4 refers to the alarm, which “was neither loud…”. The same wording is
used earlier in the analysis section as shown in textbox A4. Furthermore, there is no
mention of identified supporting evidence and the analysis may therefore be
interpreted as being biased and unjustified.
Had the investigators carried out a noise level measurement test on the bridge, then
the results of the test could have been analysed (such as by plotting an octave band
frequency analysis). Only then may a conclusion be drawn up on the noise level of
the alarm. That shortcoming from the side of the investigators led to the shipping
company disputing the analysis and leaving the reader without a definite answer on
how loud the GPS alarm is.
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E1: (page 17)
C5: Absence of appropriate
level of BRM on the vessel
allowed a basic error by one
person to result in a serious
accident. (Pg 31)

A1: (page 8)

E2: (page 17)

E3: (page 17)
A6: The AB, although
aware that the ship
had
passed
the
alteration point, did
not feel that it was his
place to suggest to
the mate that he
should alter course.
(Pg 22)

A8: (The AB) had
learnt to plot GPS
positions but was not
familiar with chart
symbols or issues
such as scale or
time/distance
estimations. He did
not realise the ship
was
standing
in
danger. (Pg 23)

Figure 3vii

A7: Such an attitude
reflects a large 'powerdistance index', a strict
hierarchy between the
senior officers and junior
officers and crew. Such
working
environment
increases the likelihood of
a one-person error. (Pg
23)

A9: The inspector notes
that the AB (as one would
expect of an AB) has no
knowledge of scale and
distance and therefore the
time it takes the vessel to
reach any particular point.
As such, he could not of
course be expected to
have known how long it
would take to reach the
apparent alteration of
course displayed on the
chart. On this basis, the
AB had no imperative
reason to draw the mate's
attention
at
0700hrs
position. BRM does not
usually require the AB to
check the watch officer's
navigation. By definition,
an AB cannot be expected
to have the skills or the
experience required to
perform
this
function.
Shipping Company - (Pg
33)

CAE Diagram for Conclusion 5.
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E6: The AB moved to
a position at the front
of the wheelhouse
forward
of
the
steering position and
waited for the mate to
re-enter
the
wheelhouse. (Pg 17)
A11: The criticism of
'large power-distance
index' is in our own
view quite unfair and
fails to take account
of the reality onboard
most ships in terms of
working relationship
between
different
ranks/ratings, bearing
in
mind
relative
abilities, experience,
knowledge and roles.
Shipping Company (Pg 33)
A10: The AB has no
training
nor
is
he
required to have any
training
(under
the
STCW Convention or
otherwise)
in
the
navigation of the vessel.
The AB questioned the
advisability of altering
course to Stb. when he
could see a sand cay on
Stb. side. In our opinion,
this indicates that the AB
(within the area of his
competence) was in fact
acting fully in accordance
with good principles of
bridge
resource/team
management. Shipping
Company - (Pg 34)

Figure 3vii shows how a single piece of evidence supports multiple analysis made by
investigators.

CAE diagrams may enable the investigators to predict where

statements rebutting the analysis of the evidence may be possibly directed268.
In this case, evidence E6 is a very important piece of evidence as it supports analysis
A7 and A8. As the diagram shows, the shipping company addressed the issue of the
able-bodied seaman (AB), who was waiting for the chief mate to take the necessary
action. A considerable part of the analysis relates to the lack of Bridge Resource
Management (BRM) and revolves around the fact that the AB plotted the ship’s
position, was aware that it had passed the waypoint but did not report back to the
chief mate.
This CAE diagram therefore plots and clarifies to the reader the •

Analyses made by the investigators to support conclusion C5;

•

Evidence presented by the investigators to support their analyses;

•

Different analyses made by the shipping company; and

•

Different interpretation of the same piece of evidence, made by the
shipping company.

The remaining two CAE diagrams in figures 3viii and 3ix share the same
characteristics of bringing together the conclusions, analysis and evidence, in
addition to comments submitted by interested parties. The page numbers at the
bottom end of the text boxes show how in certain instances, the necessary
information is widely spread across the entire report, making it more difficult for the
reader to bring together conclusions, analysis and evidence.

268

C. Johnson, supra note 216.

126

C6: Reef centre operator
was aware that the vessel
was in the area of Green
Island radar coverage, but
loss of radar signal of
vessels in Torres Strait
caused him to focus solely
on the Hammond Island
display and to concentrate
on
re-entering
the
information into the TIM.
(Pg 31)

A12:
Information
overload: It was a
malign chance that
there should be a
short
period
of
intense activity in
Reefcentre just as
Bunga Teratai Satu
had
entered
the
restricted area and
while
it
headed
towards the reef. (Pg
28)

Figure 3viii CAE Diagram for Conclusion 6.
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E7: At about 0715, the
real time radar echo of
Jin Hui, on the eastern
side of Torres Strait was
lost,
the
display
reverting to a DR target.
The operator set about
restoring Jin Hui's fused
target.
About four
minutes later, the echo
of Asia Queen also
reverted to DR, followed
soon after by Thor
Princess's display. This
took until about 0727.
There was also regular,
continuing routine VHF
traffic until a lull at
about 0732. (Pg 11)

A13: Clearly the prime
task of Reefcentre is to
receive reports from
participating ships and to
provide
information
about shipping traffic to
these ships. This was
the task on which the
operator was engaged in
Torres
Strait,
an
identified high-risk area.
It
will
be
most
unfortunate if this report
identifies
him
(the
operator) as contributing
in anyway to a marine
incident,
so
clearly
caused by a dereliction
of duty on the part of the
ship's
watchkeeping
officer.
Queensland
Department of Transport
- (Pg 28)

E8: System statistics
show that in the
calendar year 2000,
there were over 7,400
restricted area alerts,
or just about one
each
hour
of
operation. (Pg 27)

C7:
Frequency
of
annunciation of TIM alarms
and
associated
radar
systems load led to the
desensitising of Reefcentre
operators to the whole TIM
alerting system. (Pg 31)

A14: One operator
estimated that in a
12-hour shift, there
may be over 100
alerts.
The
overwhelming
majority
of
such
alarms, while not
spurious,
do
not
indicate
vessels
standing into danger.
(Pg 27)

A13: (page 28)

Figure 3ix

CAE Diagram for Conclusion 7.
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E9: In the event of an
alert, the system
gives
normal
computer prompt, a
single audible "bleep"
that a message has
been
generated.
There is no indication
until the message is
accepted on TIM, of
the level of urgency,
or which of the 17
alert messages is
indicated,
or
the
location of the alert.
(Pg 27)

Events and causal factors analysis chart269
The chart shows four event sequences running in parallel (one of which is the
primary event sequence). It is interesting to note that the report identifies the loss of
the radar signals at Reefcentre as a contributing factor to the grounding. This event
and subsequent actions taken by the Reefcentre operator are represented in the chart
as a secondary event sequence, yet, they lead to some event, subsequent to the
grounding.
The chart and the CAE diagrams in the same appendix make it easier for the reader
of this dissertation to compare and analyse the two tools. Whilst CAE diagrams
illustrate, inter alia, how conclusions may be linked, an events and causal factors
chart assist the reader to understand the chronological sequence of events.

269

As stated in chapter 4 of the dissertation, this particular casualty investigation report was
purposely selected because, inter alia, it included an events and causal factors chart. On the other
hand, to date, CAE diagrams are not annexed to casualty investigation reports sent to IMO and in
this respect, there were no other options but to construct the diagrams, based on the information
and data published in the report. However, this task served this writer to perceive how CAE
diagrams operate.
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Figure 3x
Source:

Bunga Teratai Satu Events and Causal Factors Chart.
ATSB Report 162, (2001).
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APPENDIX 4

ELECTRONIC PROMULGATION OF CASUALTY
INVESTIGATION REPORTS

Chapter four addresses the casualty investigation report per se and its present (new)
role in the maritime industry. Several investigating bodies publish their reports on
the World Wide Web, in an attempt to promote the promulgation of information.
The importance of this exercise cannot be overemphasised. It is discussed in chapter
four, section 4.1.1 that those who have suffered a casualty tend to believe that this is
only a one-off situation, which has not happened to anyone else before.

This

behaviour will inhibit the cultural changes required to prevent accidents from
recurring. This appendix attempts to briefly demonstrate how this exercise can be
improved, by the use of electronic media.
An investigating body has two options available when publishing reports
electronically; converting the text to Hypertext Markup Language (HTML) or
Portable Document Format (PDF).

Johnson highlights various advantages and

disadvantages of each option, which are summarised in tables 4i and 4ii.
Table 4i

Characteristics of HTML Reports.

HTML Format
Advantages

Disadvantages

Special computer applications are not Perception problems when reading the
required to view the document
text from the screen
Short time to download the report

Printing HTML documents might present
several problems

Hyperlinks incorporated in the report When printed, pictures will not be
ease the navigation problems (as opposed included in the hard copy.
to conventional reports).
Source: C. Johnson, Improving the Presentation of Accident Reports over the World Wide Web,
(2002).
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Table 4ii

Characteristics of PDF Reports.

PDF Format
Advantages

Disadvantages

Adobe Reader software can be freely Downloading PDF documents takes a
downloaded
longer time than HTML documents
Text and photographs will be included in Extraction of information is very difficult
the printed version.
with an encoded PDF document.
Source: C. Johnson, Improving the Presentation of Accident Reports over the World Wide Web,
(2002).

An electronic version of the casualty investigation report should be used as a tool to
enhance the casualty investigation report rather than duplicate and publish it on the
web270. In this respect, he advises image maps to enhance reports, which carry the
following advantages271 •

Serve as media to explain contributing factors and justify recommended
engineering barriers;

•

Link the text of the report with graphics;

•

Provide images of the location of the accident272 by complimenting
image maps with VRML models and QuickTimeVR techniques to enable
the reader to view the location of the accident;

•

Includes hyperlinks on the figure to return to the text of the report; and

•

Image maps can be used to link CAE diagrams to the actual page of the
report.

270

See C. Johnson, Improving the Presentation of Accident Reports over the World Wide Web,
(2002) at pp. 1-13. This paper explains in detail how virtual reality assists the presentation of
reports.

271

One main disadvantage of electronic image tools is the cost and resources it involves.

272

Referring to the latent failures identified in the case study presented in Appendix 3, the suggested
images and VRML models could include a virtual image of Sudbury Reef passage from the
bridge and an image of the vessel’s wheelhouse.
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